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I.	Introduction

It is of high importance to the peace of America that she observe the laws of nations
towards all these powers, and to me it appears evident that this will be more perfectly and
punctually done by one national government . . . .
....
[U]nder the national government, treaties and articles of treaties, as well as the law of
nations, will always be expounded in one sense and executed in the same manner . . . . The
wisdom of the convention in committing such questions to the jurisdiction and judgment of
courts appointed by and responsible only to one national government cannot be too much
commended.1
Sometimes the most popular persons and ideas in their day are the ones that are
least remembered in ours. So it has gone for John Jay. When he agreed to join with
James Madison and Alexander Hamilton to contribute to what are now known as
The Federalist Papers, he was by far the most prominent of the three.2 Jay had already
served as the president of the Continental Congress, devoted a year as minister to
Spain, helped negotiate the Treaty of Paris that ended the Revolution, and was
concluding his tenure as secretary of foreign affairs. He would, among other things,
go on to become the first Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court while at the same
time continuing his role as the nation’s foremost diplomat, negotiating the
controversial treaty that bore his name.3 Before he was sidelined by illness, Jay was to
be the senior partner among the three who constituted “Publius.”4 Today he is barely
remembered for having taken part at all.
Things have gone the same way with the ideas that Jay, and his coauthors,
thought central to the Federalist project. Jay wrote four of the first five essays to
appear in the series, and each of these addressed the proposed Constitution’s likely
benefits in foreign relations. Adding Hamilton’s initial contributions, the first nine
essays reference foreign affairs in some significant way. The initial point that Publius
sought to convey was that the Constitution would strengthen the national government
in ways that were essential for the nation’s “security for the preservation of peace and
tranquility, as well as against dangers from foreign arms and influence, as from dangers
of the like kind arising from domestic causes.”5 For Jay and Hamilton especially, a
crucial component for the maintenance of national security would be an independent
1.

The Federalist No. 3, at 43 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

2.

Walter Stahr, John Jay: Founding Father, at xiii (2005).

3.

For a recent biography, see Stahr, supra note 2. For a classic account of the negotiations for the Treaty
of Paris ending the Revolution, see Richard B. Morris, The Peacemakers: The Great Powers
and American Independence (1965).

4.

The others, more famous today, were of course Alexander Hamilton and James Madison. “Publius” was
the name chosen by Madison, Hamilton, and Jay as the authors of all Federalist Papers published between
1787 and 1788. The name honors a Roman Consul named Publius Valerius Publicola, who was one of
the founders of the Roman Republic. See The Federalist (Publius) (J. & A. McLean 1788).

5.

The Federalist No. 3, supra note 1, at 42.
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federal judiciary. Hamilton, among other things, argued not just that the federal
courts properly should resolve cases under treaties and the law of nations, but even
domestic law cases involving foreigners.6 For his part, Jay rested his position on his
experience as among the most distinguished diplomats among the Founders.
Two hundred years later, the Founders’ vision has become even more compelling.
Modern developments in international relations yield a whole new set of reasons for
the courts to play a prominent and independent role in foreign affairs matters. As
leading scholarship agrees, a commonplace result of globalization in its various forms
is an erosion of traditional national sovereignty.7 This phenomenon in part results
from subunits of governments interacting with one another, as various regulators or
judges of a given nation team up with their foreign counterparts.8 Less well considered
is which parts of a government benefit from this process relative to others. But by
any reckoning, the net winner is far and away the executive.9 So clear is the executive’s
comparative advantage that it puts still more pressure on the idea of separated,
balanced government branches, which the Founders assumed would be a core feature
of the government they were establishing. In this way, the domestic effects of
globalization merely work to further augment the steady growth in presidential
power relative to Congress and the courts over the past two centuries. Even sixty
years ago, this escalation had already prompted Justice Jackson to declare that even
though executive power might eclipse balanced, democratic institutions, “it is the
duty of the Court to be the last, not first, to give them up.”10 Together, a renewed
appreciation for the Founding along with the most current insights of international
relations analysis should make the Justice’s alarm, if anything, more ominous than
the wartime setting in which he made it.
Yet what should be consensus on the courts’ foreign affairs role has never faced
greater challenge. Instead, a dubious wisdom extolling judicial deference threatens to
become conventional. In a variety of contexts, less cosmopolitan successors of the
first Chief Justice have called for the judiciary to refrain from “say[ing] what the law
is”11 when doing so would implicate the foreign policy goals of the other branches.
First occasionally, then with greater consistency, various federal judges have argued
for judicial deference to Congress and above all to the President on a range of issues,
including the interpretation of treaties, statutes, and the Constitution; the use of
international and comparative law to constrain government actors; and the
determination of whether a case is justiciable in the first place. Judge Brett Kavanaugh
of the D.C. Circuit captured the spirit of this growing line of thinking in declaring
that “[I]n our constitutional system of separated powers, it is for Congress and the
6.

The Federalist No. 80, at 476–77 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

7.

See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (2004); Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S.
Nye, Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations, 27 World Pol. 39 (1974).

8.

See Slaughter, supra note 7.

9.

See infra Part II.

10.

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634, 655 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).

11.

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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President—not the courts—to determine in the first instance whether and how the
United States will meet its international obligations.”12 Yet even this expression of
judicial isolationism pales next to its academic counterpart. Various academics have
for years advocated that so far as foreign relations go, the courts that adjudicate least
adjudicate best.13 The most insistent voice for this position far and away has been the
tireless John Yoo.14 As he puts it, courts limiting the President’s ability to take urgent
national security measures constitutes an “Imperial Judiciary at War,” not with the
nation’s enemies but with the Constitution’s ostensible command to permit the
executive branch to respond to foreign threats unchecked by the courts.15
For a time the forces of judicial isolationism appeared to have gained traction and
may yet carry the day. It is all the more surprising, then, that the Supreme Court
reasserted the judiciary’s traditional foreign affairs role in the areas in which its
opponents assert deference is most urgent—national security, terrorism, and war. Yet
so far, in every major case arising out of 9/11, the Court has rejected the position
staked out by the executive branch, even when supported by Congress. At critical
points, moreover, each of these rejections involved the Court reclaiming its primacy
in legal interpretation, an area in which advocates of judicial deference have appeared
to make substantial progress. The Court nonetheless rejected deference in statutory
construction in Rasul v. Bush.16 It took the same tack with regard to treaties in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.17 It further rejected deference in constitutional interpretation in
both Hamdi v. Rumsfeld18 and Boumediene v. Bush.19 Together, these cases represent a
stunning reassertion of the judiciary’s proper role in foreign relations. Whether
reassertion will mean restoration, however, still remains to be seen.
This essay sketches the foundations for assuring that restoration, an undertaking
that offers a firmer basis for the Court’s 9/11 jurisprudence. Part II will consider the
doctrine of judicial deference, which threatens, partly successfully and partly not, to
remove the judiciary from its proper role in foreign relations. Part III begins a critique
of the deference doctrine by returning to separation of powers fundamentals,
especially as understood at the Founding. As John Jay suggests, the Founders
generally believed that the judiciary should be a full player in the separation of powers
12.

Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 12 (2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc).

13.

Id. at 11–12 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc).

14.

Professor Yoo has collected his ideas in a de facto trilogy. John Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace:
The Constitution and Foreign Affairs After 9/11 (2005); John Yoo, War by Other Means:
An Insider’s Account of the War on Terror (2006); John Yoo, Crisis and Command: The
History of Executive Power from George Washington to George W. Bush (2009).

15.

See generally John Yoo, An Imperial Judiciary at War: Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 2005–2006 CATO Sup. Ct.
Rev. 83.

16.

542 U.S. 466, 480 (2004).

17.

548 U.S. 557, 577–78 (2006).

18.

542 U.S. 507, 532–33 (2004).

19.

553 U.S. 723, 797–98 (2008).
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framework, including foreign relations. 20 Among other things, this expectation
meant the courts should interpret the law—including international law—without
deference to the President or Congress, even when the nation’s foreign policy was at
stake. Part IV demonstrates that current developments in international relations
make the Founding design more vital, not less. Globalization, along with typical
responses to global terror, represent new forces accelerating the comparative growth
of executive authority throughout the world, not least in the United States. The
resulting imbalance of power makes the need for an independent judicial check, if
anything, more critical now than it was originally, above all in foreign relations. Part
V builds upon these foundations to supplement the rationales that the Court offered
in its principal 9/11 decisions. In particular, this section argues that the Court rightly
afforded the President zero deference when interpreting statutes, treaties, and
constitutional provisions. This essay concludes that the Court should draw upon
both original understanding and international relations to solidify its recent
reassertion of its proper role in foreign relations cases.
II. Judicial Deference to the Executive in Foreign Relations

A. Hamdan versus Sanchez-Llamas

The Supreme Court’s recent foreign relations cases suggest the apparent growing
judicial deference toward the executive in foreign relations has reached a stalemate,
or at least a muddle. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 21 for example, indicates the doctrine
of judicial deference is alive and well. There the Court agreed with the President
that the Vienna Consular Convention did not require an exclusionary rule to
safeguard the treaty’s right of an arrested foreign national to consult with the consular
officials of his or her nation.22 Among other things, the majority based its decision
on the contention that the executive’s own interpretation of the Convention was
owed “great weight.”23 Even Justice Breyer in dissent made clear his agreement with
the “great weight” formulation.24
By contrast, in 9/11 cases such as Hamdan, deference was conspicuous by its near
total absence. Hamdan required the Court to interpret Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 as incorporated by Congress25 in the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ).26 On this point the administration vigorously put forward
the novel and radical argument that Common Article 3 could not apply to alleged
20. See The Federalist No. 3, supra note 1.
21.

548 U.S. 331 (2006).

22.

Id. at 355–56.

23.

Id. at 355.

24.

Id. at 378 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

25.

548 U.S. 557, 567. For an assessment of the case, see Martin S. Flaherty, More Real than Apparent:
Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law, and Comparative Executive “Creativity,” in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
2005–2006 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 51.

26. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–950 (2006).
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members of al-Qaeda because the “Global War on Terror” was by definition
international, whereas the treaty provision applied only to “‘armed conflict not of an
international character . . . .’”27 Justice Stevens’s opinion of the Court made short
work of this contention, properly holding that the treaties’ text, structure, and history
all indicate that the protections of Common Article 3 apply as the baseline in any
armed conflict.28 The opinion rejects the President’s position, moreover, without any
indication that it is doing so notwithstanding a presumption that the executive’s
interpretation is owed substantial weight. The Court’s failure to mention this
presumption, even if overcome in this case, becomes all the more striking given
Justice Thomas’s reliance on the doctrine in dissent. 29
The opinions and citations in these cases nonetheless make several matters clear.
First, foreign relations deference is of relatively recent vintage, a fact that tends to
undermine several conventional justifications. Second, the doctrine remains
effectively contested. Finally, the doctrine appears in numerous contexts. Directly
(Sanchez-Llamas) and indirectly (Hamdan), the cases and their accompanying citations
center on deference in treaty interpretation. But similar possibilities for deference to
the executive appear in a range of foreign relations areas. These include interpretation
of federal statutes implicating foreign affairs;30 interpretation and application of
customary international law;31 recognition of foreign governments;32 state secrets;33
and use of the political question doctrine,34 among others. The following analysis
will focus on treaty interpretation as a window into the current state of the deference
doctrine more generally.
A glance at the citations in Sanchez-Llamas and Hamdan suggests that the
doctrine has a surprisingly recent pedigree. Recent work by professor David Sloss
confirms that the foreign relations deference was neither present at the creation of
the republic, nor evident for a long period thereafter.35 In the nation’s first fifty years
under the Constitution, the Supreme Court applied nothing less than a “zero
27.

See Brief for Respondents at 48, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184), 2006 U.S. S.
Ct. Briefs LEXIS 292, at **88 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316).

28. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 630–32.
29. Compare id. at 635 (stating assumptions made by the majority, of which deference to the executive is not

included), with id. at 678–80 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (affirming a “well-established duty” to defer to
executive interpretations in reference to the military and foreign affairs).

30. See, e.g., Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 348 (2005).
31.

See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).

32.

See, e.g., Mingtai Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United Parcel Serv., 177 F.3d 1142, 1144–45 (9th Cir.
1999).

33.

See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 563 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010); David
Rudenstine, The Day the Presses Stopped: A History of the Pentagon Papers Case (1996).

34. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
35.

David Sloss, Judicial Deference to Executive Branch Treaty Interpretations: A Historical Perspective, 62
N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 497, 498–99 (2007).
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deference” approach to the executive when interpreting treaties.36 At points, the
Court even enunciated a duty not to defer.37 For that matter, the executive concurred.
In response to French entreaties that he intervene on behalf of France, then secretary
of state Edmund Randolph replied:
The courts of justice exercise the sovereignty of this country in judiciary
matters, are supreme in these, and liable neither to control nor opposition
from any other branch of the Government . . . . For, if the President were
even to decide that a prize ought not to be prosecuted in our courts, the
decision would be treated as an intrusion by those courts, and the judicial
proceedings would go on notwithstanding. So speak the constitution and the
law.38

For its part, the Court guarded the Constitution and the law jealously. Justice
Johnson, though dissenting, expressed the Justices’ common view, declaring, “[T]he
views of the administration, are wholly out of the question in this Court. What is the
just construction of a treaty is the only question here. And whether it chime in with
the views of the Government or not, this individual is entitled to the benefit of
construction.”39 As professor Sloss shows, of nineteen cases during this period in
which the U.S. government was a party, the government lost fourteen and won only
three, with two effectively split.40 In fact, the first signs of an obligation to defer do
not appear until the late nineteenth century.41 Even then, those signs remained few
and far between for almost a century thereafter. It remains the case that no more
than a handful of decisions actually mention a requirement to defer, and most of
these do little more than allude to the idea in passing.42 For all the attention deference
receives, its actual application remains surprisingly meager.
This paucity in turn suggests that the constitutional bases for the idea are likewise
modest. Deference hardly seems compelled by text. To the contrary, the Supremacy
Clause’s conversion of treaties into federal law points to a zero deference approach.
Nor does original understanding offer any support. Instead, early U.S. sources point
in just the opposite direction. As will be seen, structural analysis might offer
justifications for deference given the President’s institutional advantages in conducting
foreign affairs. Yet the Article III values, articulated by Randolph and Johnson, cut
just the other way and have carried the day for much of the nation’s history. In terms
of conventional interpretation, the best possible remaining basis for deference is
36. See id. at 499.
37.

See The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 68 (1821); see also id. at 92 (Johnson, J., dissenting).

38. Letter from Edmund Randolph, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Joseph Fauchet, Minister Plenipotentiary of the

French Republic (June 13, 1795), in 1 American State Papers: Foreign Relations 618 (Walter
Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., 1833).

39.

The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 92 (Johnson, J., dissenting).

40. Sloss, supra note 35, at 506.
41.

Id.

42.

See generally Robert M. Chesney, Disaggregating Deference: The Judicial Power and Executive Treaty
Interpretations, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 1723 (2007).
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evolving constitutional custom. And while a previously non-existent deference
doctrine has emerged, it is hardly as entrenched in precedent as such other lateblooming mechanisms as state sovereign immunity.43
However novel, deference’s repeated appearance in recent case law illustrates the
second preliminary point, namely, that it has gained a toehold in modern jurisprudence
anyway and is further positioned for real gains. Several developments support this
assessment. First, the doctrine appears somewhat more frequently as an express
judicial trope. In this, Sanchez-Llamas follows El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng;44
Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano;45 United States v. Stuart;46 and Kolovrat v.
Oregon.47 Second, as professor David Bederman first demonstrated, from the 1950s
through the early 1990s, the executive’s interpretation of statutes and treaties has
been the best predictor of at least the Supreme Court’s own interpretation.48
Subsequent work by professor Robert Chesney for the federal courts generally
demonstrates that the executive’s success may not be as pronounced as Bederman’s
initial work suggests.49 Nonetheless, the modern executive prevails in treaty cases
almost in inverse proportion to the frequency the executive lost in the early republic.
Third, explicit articulations of deference have accounted for some of the most recent,
high-profile lower court opinions. Of note here is United States v. Lindh,50 the
“American Taliban” case, in which the district court adopted a deference model based
upon Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC 51 and accordingly held that John Walker Lindh
was not entitled to POW status under the Third Geneva Convention.52 Similarly, in
Hamdan itself, the D.C. Circuit cited its obligation to defer in adopting the executive’s
radical interpretation that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions did not
extend to armed conflict that crossed international borders.53
43.

Cf. Martin S. Flaherty, Are We to Be a Nation?, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1277, 1282–85 (1999) (discussing
the Supreme Court’s handling of state law intrusion into federal constitutional realms and vice versa);
Martin S. Flaherty, More Apparent than Real: The Revolutionary Commitment to Constitutional Federalism,
45 U. Kan. L. Rev. 993, 993 (1997) (discussing federalism protections for state governments and
identifying this doctrine as sovereignty federalism).

44. 525 U.S. 155 (1999). In contrast to its predecessors, however, El Al expressly softens the degree of

deference to be accorded executive interpretations from “great weight” to “[r]espect is ordinarily due the
reasonable views of the Executive Branch concerning the meaning of an international treaty.” Id. at 168.
See infra notes 54, 79, 80 and accompanying text.

45.

457 U.S. 176 (1982).

46. 489 U.S. 353 (1989).
47.

366 U.S. 187 (1961).

48. See David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 953, 961–62,

1015–16 (1994).

49. Chesney, supra note 42, at 1741–58.
50. 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002).
51.

467 U.S. 837 (1984).

52.

Id. at 556.

53.

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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The Sanchez-Llamas/Hamdan pairing in the Supreme Court reflects the ongoing
confusion. On one hand, the doctrine has rhetorically shifted the burden onto parties
who cling to the historic idea that courts interpreting laws or treaties that touch upon
foreign affairs owe an obligation to nothing other than their own sound interpretation.
Yet as Hamdan shows, the ostensible obligation can disappear without a trace and in
cases that are among the highest profile cases as well.
B. “Weight”

At least the Supreme Court’s failure to justify deference may have something to
do with its actual status in current jurisprudence, Sanchez-Llamas included. Much
like a blimp, the doctrine appears ponderous but in reality has little weight. The
leading cases almost always repeat the formula that the executive’s treaty
interpretations are due “much weight,”54 “great weight,”55 “duty to respect,”56 or, at
the very least, due consideration in the form of “[r]espect . . . due [to] the reasonable
views of the Executive Branch.”57 Even a cursory review of the cases, however,
demonstrates that the impressive-sounding formula does no actual work.
Start not with In re Ross58 but Charlton v. Kelly,59 the first case ostensibly to
articulate a deference standard.60 In holding that an extradition treaty made no
exception for U.S. citizens to be delivered up to Italy, the Court famously deployed
this statement: “A construction of a treaty by the political department of the
[g]overnment, while not conclusive upon a court called upon to construe such a treaty
. . . is nevertheless of much weight.”61 That declaration, however, came only after the
Court had resolved the matter already. With typical early twentieth-century economy,
Justice Lurton came to the conclusion based first on the plain meaning of the treaty’s
term “persons,” next on “accepted principles of public international law” as traced
through a brief history of the exemption from the eighteenth century, on a reference
to a treatise on extradition by John Bassett, and on a survey of U.S. treaties’
contrasting agreements in which the exception is and is not clearly specified. Only
then does the “much weight” statement appear with reference to the executive’s
interpretation of the treaty at hand, and then only in light of the United States’
consistent practice with extradition treaties generally. Even then, the Court returns
54. Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 468 (1913).
55.

Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961).

56. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 678 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
57.

El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 168 (1999).

58. 140 U.S. 453 (1891). Ross, ostensibly the first deference case, did not actually articulate a standard.

Moreover, the Court’s analysis relied not simply on the executive’s interpretation of the relevant treaty,
but on the consistent practice of both treaty-making parties and only after close consideration of the
treaty’s text. See id. at 466–69.

59.

229 U.S. 447, 468 (1913).

60. Id.
61.

Id.
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to John Basset Moore, who himself argues the plain meaning, the existence of treaties
with and without express exceptions, and the apparently joint practice of the United
States and United Kingdom following the plain meaning of their own 1842
extradition treaty.62
The canon has generally done even less work ever since. In Sullivan v. Kidd, the
Court for the first time recycles the “much weight” standard, but again only after a
careful review of the treaty provisions at hand, the general principles of public
international law, and the extreme consequences that would result from the opposing
interpretation, which would have effectively allowed subjects throughout the British
empire to inherit land in the United States.63 The pattern continued in more recent
times with Kolovrat v. Oregon,64 where the Court ratcheted up the apparent deference
standard to “great weight,” for the interpretations “by the departments of government
particularly charged with [a treaty’s] negotiation and enforcement.”65 Notwithstanding
this language, the Court turned first to the treaty’s text, its general purpose, the
canon that treaties conveying rights are to be construed liberally, other similar treaties
to which the United States was a party, and even the “hope[s]” and “desire[s]” of the
nationals of each country for whom the treaty was intended to benefit.66 Even when
Justice Black gets to the practice with regard to the treaty under consideration, he
refers to the mutual application of the treaty by both the contracting parties.67 Much
the same pattern applies in Sumitomo, another “great weight” case, where Chief
Justice Burger considers the executive’s interpretation only after pages of textual
analysis, and even then only in conjunction with the parallel interpretation followed
by Japan.68 At the risk of monotony, the same holds for Stuart, where the agency’s
interpretation of a treaty as a source of deference gets one sentence amidst paragraphs
of more conventional interpretive analysis.69
For that matter, the same pattern holds in Sanchez-Llamas. For all that SanchezLlamas may be taken as a reaffirmation of deference, the canon plays an exceptionally
modest role. It simply does not figure at all in the Court’s consideration of the case’s
first issue: whether the Vienna Convention on Consular Relation’s (VCCR) “full
effect” language requires the application of an exclusionary rule.70 To address this,
Chief Justice Roberts relied exclusively on an analysis of treaty text in the context of
62. See id. at 466–69.
63. 254 U.S. 433, 435–43 (1921).
64. 366 U.S. 187 (1961).
65.

Id. at 194.

66. Id. at 194, 195–97.
67.

Id. at 191–95.

68. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180–85 (1982).
69. 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989).
70. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 337–39 (2006); Vienna Convention on Consular Relations

art. 36, ¶ 2, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 100–101.
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“constitutional common law” 71 remedies for similar domestic rights.72 Citation to
Kolovrat’s version of the “great weight” standard does appear with regard to the issue
of whether the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) interpretation of the VCCR, or
the treaty itself, requires the setting aside of state procedural default rules on habeas,73
especially in light of the ICJ’s contrary rulings.74 The Kolovrat citation, however,
comes only after consideration of the Supreme Court’s own precedent on this point
in Breard v. Greene,75 which itself did not rely on deference of the statute of the ICJ,
nor, ironically for a deference case, of Marbury’s proposition that the federal courts in
our constitutional system have the duty “to say what the law is.”76 After then devoting
a single sentence to the executive’s interpretation of the VCCR, the Chief Justice
proceeds to a close and substantive critique of the ICJ’s analysis as it applies to the
domestic constitutional system of the United States.77
Perhaps even more ironically, the only case to have produced an opinion in which
deference actually drives the analysis is Hamdan. The irony diminishes, however,
upon noting that the opinion comes from Justice Thomas in dissent. As on many
other points, the Thomas dissent parts company with the majority with regard to
whether Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applies to the “conflict with
al Qaeda.”78 Before attempting any independent analysis, Justice Thomas finds the
argument that the provision does apply to be “meritless” based on the Court’s “duty
to defer” to the conclusion of the Justice (not State) Department as accepted by the
President as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive.79 Only after this does Justice
Thomas adopt the argument that the provision’s language applying its protections to
“conflicts not of any international character” cannot apply since the struggle with
al-Qaeda occurs “in various nations around the globe.”80 The dissent does concede
that the majority’s position, which follows the treaty’s text, history, structure, and
near consensus interpretation, is “plausible.” 81 Yet “where, as here, an ambiguous
treaty provision . . . is susceptible of two plausible, and reasonable, interpretations,
71.

See generally Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1975).

72. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 355.
73. Id. at 355–66.
74.

See Avéna and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 56, 112, 128 (Mar. 31), http://
www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/128/8188.pdf; LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 477–78, 495,
556–57 (June 27), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/104/4663.pdf.

75. 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
76. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
77.

See Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 350–60.

78. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 718–19 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 719 (quoting Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6

U.S.T. 3316).

81.

Id.
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our precedents require us to defer to the Executive’s interpretation.”82 Here, at last, is
real deference. The only trouble is, it is not actually compelled by the case law to
which it alludes.
That case law instead shows that deference in this setting is essentially an add-on.
Invariably, it appears as little more than a passing reference to conclusions that have
already been reached on the basis of significant textual, structural, purposive,
comparative, or general international legal analysis. To the extent the cases diverge
from this pattern, they show that deference to executive interpretation is not on the
table. At times, the Court instead has considered early practice as evidence of the
treaty-making parties’ intent. At other times, it has relied on the longstanding
practice of all state parties to a treaty as probative of mutual understanding and
perhaps reliance. Of course, it could be that deference to the executive is really what
is driving the case outcomes, notwithstanding what the Court actually says. But
were this so, and were this proposition somehow provable, the Court’s duty to offer
reasoned arguments requires it to say so. And if not, the Court should make that
stance plain. As it is, the halfway stance of announcing a standard that does no real
work serves neither the standard’s advocates, the detractors, nor the public.
Nor, it should be pointed out, has the Court made out the nominal standard as
consistently as is sometimes claimed. Prior to Sanchez-Llamas, the Court’s previous
articulation of the deference standard came in more muted form in El Al.83 Writing
for the majority, Justice Ginsburg demoted the “great weight” standard to the mere
“[r]espect [that] is ordinarily due the reasonable views of the Executive Branch
concerning the meaning of an international treaty.”84 Flipping the usual pattern, she
then concludes that “the Government’s construction . . . is most faithful to the
[treaty’s] text, purpose, and overall structure,” devoting the rest of the opinion to
demonstrating just that.85 In this she follows Justice Stone, who himself demoted
“great weight” to mere “weight”86 or “recourse,”87 and then only to negotiating history
or diplomatic correspondence by the treaty-making parties rather than executive
interpretation more generally.
Then again, blimps sometimes fly. For now, the actual clout of the deference
doctrine may be more apparent than real. But mere appearances often presage reality.
United States Reports is filled with doctrines that began as novelties, became plausible,
and are now entrenched. State sovereign immunity is one.88 The assault on customary
international law is on the way.89 Judicial deference to the executive in foreign
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 168 (1999).
84. Id. at 168.
85. Id. at 168–77.
86. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 295 (1933).
87.

Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 52 (1929); Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523 (1926).

88. See Are We to be a Nation?, supra note 44, at 1283–86.
89. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.692, 735–38 (2004).
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relations is already far more pronounced than at the Founding. Numerous advocates
and commentators strongly press for the doctrine in articles and briefs. Whether
they say they are doing it or not, courts today generally follow the executive’s lead.
Justice Thomas’s dissent may be a first step for the Court in both proclaiming and
actually following an obligation to defer. Deference, in short, may attain the status
its advocates seek, and sooner than may be supposed. All this confirms the paradox
of taking a feeble doctrine very seriously.
C. Justifications

Just as deference’s status and weight remain muddled, so too do the judicial
arguments made on the doctrine’s behalf. For its part, the Supreme Court has never
articulated a justification, a failure that suggests either that the doctrine is so well
entrenched that a defense would be superfluous or that the doctrine has crept into
the case law with little or no thought. Lower courts, commentators, and advocates
have therefore had to fill the breach. At the risk of some oversimplification, two sets
of defenses are prominent: institutional expertise and democratic accountability. In
treaty interpretation as in other settings, far and away the most frequently voiced
defenses sound in the purported institutional superiority of the “political,” especially
the executive, branches to guide U.S. foreign relations. As it happens, such foreign
affairs expertise resides in the very branches that are directly accountable to the
American electorate, especially the one office elected nationwide. So perfunctory,
however, is the Supreme Court’s general treatment of the deference doctrine that its
own explanations for the obligation provide only the most conclusory defenses. For
more extensive articulations, one must look to either the lower federal courts or
commentators.
Perhaps the most familiar justification for foreign affairs deference lays in the
political branches’—above all the executive’s—comparative institutional advantages
in the conduct of foreign affairs. Among other things, these advantages are most
commonly said to arise from the executive’s access to information, its comparative
decisiveness, and its consequent position as the branch best suited to speak on behalf
of the nation with one voice.90
To these direct assertions of institutional superiority comes an indirect counterpart
that arises when the executive has engaged in longstanding practice. Starting with In
re Ross, the Supreme Court has usually, though not always, linked a presumption to
defer to treaty interpretations that the executive has “consistently upheld,” especially
in different settings and circumstances.91 Emphasis on executive consistency does not
necessarily reflect comparative institutional advantage. On the analogy of treaty to
90. See John Yoo, Politics as Law?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of Powers, and Treaty

Interpretation, 89 Calif. L. Rev. 851, 873–77 (2001) (reviewing Frances Fitzgerald, Way Out
There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War (2000)).

91.

Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 468 (1913); cf. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 468 (1891) (quoting a
communication made in 1881 by the U.S. minister for Japan to the secretary of state: “The President
and the department have always construed the treaty of 1858” in a certain manner).
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contract law, longstanding practice may reflect a species of reliance interest, especially
when other states that have acceded to an agreement have followed the same
interpretation.92 Especially, early consistent interpretation may be probative of the
treaty-making parties’ controlling intent,93 much the same way the Supreme Court
privileges the actions of early Congresses as plausible ref lections of the original
understandings of the Constitution’s ratifiers.94 Yet deference keyed to consistency
may also reflect institutional competence nonetheless. A longstanding and unbroken
interpretation of a treaty, or provisions in a particular type of treaty, plausibly reflects
all the executive’s advantages in foreign affairs on the theory that superior knowledge,
decisiveness, and special position as the primary voice of the United States in foreign
affairs all pointed to a particular interpretation early on. And these interpretations
have served to confirm such a reading of the treaty or particular treaty provisions
ever since, apart from the vagaries of changes in administration or the need to adopt
litigation positions in particular cases.
To these values of expertise may be added an overlapping set of justifications
founded on democratic accountability. The strong version of these claims tends to
follow back to Hamilton’s observation that, although treaties may presumptively be
“the supreme Law of the Land,” and as such the province of the judicial department,
they nonetheless remain contracts between states, thereby making them instruments
of foreign policy and in turn the job of the political branches—above all, the executive
branch.95 This division comports with democratic accountability in at least three ways.
First, it follows the original assignment of tasks by “We the People” as a matter of
higher constitutional lawmaking. Second, the assignment places the conduct of foreign
policy in the hands of representatives accountable to the people during normal times
through periodic elections. Third, and with special regard for the President, deference
to the executive in part reflects the necessity of designating a primary voice to speak
92.

See Charlton, 229 U.S. at 472–74.

93.

See, e.g., Ross, 140 U.S. at 475–76; Charlton, 229 U.S. at 467–68; see also Chesney, supra note 42, at
1741–43 (distinguishing executive interpretive authority and executive practice as evidence of intent).

94.

See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003) (rejecting a challenge to the extension of copyright
terms with heavy reliance on the actions of the first Congress); Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 455, 457
(2002) (rejecting Utah’s challenge to a census method undertaken by North Carolina based in part on
the meaning of the phrase “actual enumeration” in the first Congress); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S.
783, 783, 790–91 (1983) (finding the legislative chaplaincy does not violate the Establishment Clause in
part because the first Congress made use of such a chaplaincy:
Standing alone, historical patterns cannot justify contemporary violations of
constitutional guarantees, but there is far more here than simply historical patterns. In
this context, historical evidence sheds light not only on what the draftsmen intended
the Establishment Clause to mean, but also on how they thought that Clause applied to
the practice authorized by the First Congress—their actions reveal their intent.

(emphasis added)); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 316, 401–02 (1819) (relying on the
actions of the first Congress in part to uphold the establishment of the national bank); see also Michael
Bhargava, The First Congress Canon and the Supreme Court’s Use of History, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1745,
1746–47 (2006).
95. See The Federalist No. 75, at 449–54 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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on behalf of the United States in foreign relations combined with the propriety of
designating the one policymaker who is elected on a national basis.
A more modest, though influential, democratic argument comes from professor
Curtis Bradley.96 Bradley contends that the judiciary does and should defer to executive
interpretation of treaties in much the same way it bows to executive, especially agency,
interpretations of statutes under Chevron.97 To a significant extent, he bases the
analogy upon considerations of “fit.”98 As under Chevron, courts interpreting treaties
will not resort to deference when the relevant text is unambiguous. Yet, as also under
Chevron, where ambiguity exists, or where the treaty simply fails to address the issue,
courts will generally follow the executive’s interpretation unless it is unreasonable.99
Though Chevron deference has much to do with administrative expertise,
professor Bradley acknowledges that its ultimate justification rests upon the inference
that Congress has delegated authority to resolve ambiguities or fill gaps to the agency
assigned with administering a given statute.100 It follows that for the Chevron analogy
to work, the theory must be that the President plus two-thirds of the senators present
must be presumed to delegate similar authority to either the State Department as a
general matter or to specific agencies that a particular treaty designates for
implementation.
As critics have pointed out, the Chevron analogy is not without problems. The
Court has made clear that full Chevron deference is most appropriate when an agency
has offered an interpretation of a statute based upon the type of deliberation that
comes from providing interested parties with notice and a hearing or some form of
adjudication. Less thorough deliberation ordinarily triggers no more than Skidmore
v. Swift & Co.101 consideration, and mere agency litigation positions do not command
even that.102 It is far from clear how the treaty setting will produce deliberative
opportunities to the same extent as domestic statutes, especially in the case of human
rights treaties. Professor Michael Van Alstine has rightly pointed out, moreover, that
it is even less clear how a general treaty is like an organic statute that regulates a
particular field and creates an agency to administer the policies that the statute sets
out.103 As will be seen, neither the problems with the Chevron analogy, nor with the
justifications for deference in general, end here.
96. Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 Va. L. Rev. 649 (2000).
97.

Id. at 651–53 (referring to the reasoning of, and the deference granted by the Supreme Court, in Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).

98. Bradley, supra note 96, at 703–04.
99. Id. at 669.
100. Id. at 670–71. That said, professor Bradley rightly notes that in reality, considerations of executive

expertise and, at least on the surface, democratic accountability are prevalent. Id. at 669–70.

101. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
102. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988); see also Evan Criddle, Scholarship

Comment, Chevron Deference and Treaty Interpretation, 112 Yale L.J. 1927, 1934 (2003).

103. Here the leading analysis is provided in Michael P. Van Alstine, The Death of Good Faith in Treaty

Jurisprudence and a Call for Resurrection, 93 Geo. L.J. 1885, 1897–1902 (2006).
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III.	Something Old: Separation of Powers, Domestic and Foreign

A. First Principles

Judicial foreign affairs deference has not been without numerous critics from
numerous angles. Most, however, share a common reliance on separation of powers
in general and a heavy dependence on Marbury in particular. As the Court ironically
reiterated in Sanchez-Llamas, it is emphatically the province of the judiciary to declare
what the law is.104 It follows that treaties, both as international law and the “supreme
Law of the Land,” are in the first instance to be interpreted as such, a tenet that
includes any theory of interpretive delegation, which would have to come through
the law itself. This form of argument is fine as far as it goes. But the formal Marbury
argument falls short nonetheless. In particular, it fails to engage with the larger,
functional separation of powers assumptions that its defenders put forward, above all
the argument from executive expertise and efficiency.
Engaging these assumptions instead requires a more general review of separation
of powers’ first principles. The exercise may not break new ground. Yet the review
remains worth the effort for at least two reasons. First, the general functions of
American separation of powers remain oddly underappreciated even in domestic
constitutional theory, in part due to a misplaced reliance on more formalist
approaches.105 Second, even though foreign relations law entails separation of powers,
the application of the latter to the former remains oddly narrow and workman-like
compared to domestic analysis.
As I have sought to demonstrate elsewhere, conventional sources of constitutional
text, structure, and, above all, history provide substantial yet frustratingly insufficient
guidance in resolving modern separation of powers controversies. Absent specific
text, and even then rarely, these sources do not deliver precise answers to the types of
questions that generally wind up in the courts. A classic case in this regard is the
removal power, which has bedeviled American constitutional law ever since the
question first arose with regard to the First Congress’s attempt to limit the President’s
ability to fire whoever would occupy the newly established office of Secretary of
State.106 And as is widely noted, the lack of precise guidance only grows in the foreign
relations context. Not for nothing did Edward Corwin declare that the Constitution
extended to the Congress and the President in particular an “invitation to struggle”
in foreign affairs.107 Conversely, lack of precision does not mean there is no guidance
whatsoever. As set out in the Constitution, separation of powers is a sketch partially
inked in at the top to be worked out more fully over time,108 consistent with several
functions that become especially clear by reference to the history of the Founding.
104. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 354 (2006).
105. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L.J. 1725, 1738–45 (1996).
106. See Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102

Mich. L. Rev. 545, 641–44 (2004).

107. Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers 1787–1984, at 201 (5th ed. 1984).
108. Flaherty, supra note 105, at 1777–78.
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Of these functions, by far the most salient is balance. Perhaps the single most
important factor that led the founding generation to reconsider and rethink separation
of powers was the concentration of too much power in the state legislatures at the
expense of the other branches of government, an imbalance that in turn led to the
counterintuitive discovery of “democratic despotism.”109 Benjamin Rush, for example,
condemned the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution in part because “the supreme,
absolute, and uncontrolled power of the State is lodged in the hands of one body of
men.”110 Thomas Jefferson made the same point more eloquently, lamenting Virginia’s
Constitution of 1777, writing:
All the powers of the government, legislative, executive, and judiciary,
result to the legislative body. The concentrating [of] these [powers] in the
same hands is precisely the definition of despotic government. It will be no
alleviation that these powers will be exercised by a plurality of hands, and not
by a single one. 173 despots would surely be as oppressive as one. . . .
[G]overnment . . . should not only be founded on free principles, but . . . the
powers of government should be so divided and balanced among several
bodies of magistracy, as that no one could transcend their legal limits, without
being effectively checked and restrained by the others.111

With few exceptions, at no time during the Founding period did any advocates of
separation of powers argue for a complete, rigid, or formal separation. Rather, the
Founders embraced the doctrine above all else for its general promise that no branch
of government would ever again become as powerful, or tyrannical, as the original
state legislatures.112
Separation of powers further addressed the problem of democratic despotism by
reconceptualizing the idea of accountability. Straightforward representation, in the
sense of replicating the populace as much as possible in the halls of the legislature,
had proven unworkable and dangerous. In the eyes of many Founders, services such
as annual elections, a relatively broad franchise, term limits, and rotation in office
had paradoxically rendered the state legislatures less representative, or at least less
representative of the people’s more deliberative selves, by promoting factions and
demagoguery. The solution eventually came in the form of giving all the branches of
government a more representative foundation. This strategy, in the words of
Massachusetts’s reform constitution of 1780, would ensure that “[a]ll power residing
originally in the people, and being derived from them, the several magistrates and
officers of government, vested with authority, whether legislature, executive, or
judicial, are their substitutes and agents, and are at all times accountable to them.”113
109. See Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787, at 404 (1998)

(quoting John Adams).

110. Wood, supra note 109, at 441 (1998) (quoting Benjamin Rush).
111. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, in Thomas Jefferson: Writings 123, 245 (Merrill

D. Peterson ed., 1984).

112. Flaherty, supra note 105, at 1763–64, 1766.
113. Mass. Const. pt. I, art. V.
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Before the development of this new conception of “joint accountability,” executives
and judiciaries were generally chosen and controlled by the legislatures. Following
the lead of Massachusetts, the federal Constitution embraced the new strategy
through innovations that are today taken for granted. The new President was to be
less or more directly elected. The judiciary was to be chosen by that directly elected
official in conjunction with the upper house of Congress. In these ways joint
accountability clearly enhanced the independence and authority of each of the
branches against the others, particularly the newly strengthened executive and
judiciary. But they also, and critically, ensured that no branch of government could
lay claim to the mandate of the people to pursue policies not widely supported.114
After, but only after, this comes a further functional promise of efficiency, at
least in terms of historical frequency, tone, and emphasis. A concern with effectiveness
in turn arose out of at least two considerations. One was the general weakness of
republican forms of government. Shays’s Rebellion, during which farmers in western
Massachusetts rioted against state authority in 1786, provided perhaps the most
spectacular manifestation of this problem.115 The other concern was weaknesses
specific to the Articles of Confederation, especially in the conduct of foreign relations.
Perhaps most notoriously here, lack of national power enabled the states to frustrate
U.S. treaty commitments, which provided the United Kingdom in particular a
pretext to keep troops stationed in the nation’s northwestern territory.116 These
considerations primarily, though not exclusively,117 militated toward an increasing
emphasis on the independence and authority of the executive.118 This emphasis
helped confirm the principle of a new federal executive branch headed by a single
person (the original meaning of “unitary executive”), selection independent of the
legislature, and specific grants of power beyond merely implementing the laws,
including the authority to command the armed forces, make treaties, and recognize
foreign governments through the power to receive ambassadors. There is, however,
virtually no evidence of any general grant of foreign affairs power.119 Nor is there any
114. See Flaherty, supra note 105, at 1766–89; see also Martin S. Flaherty, Relearning Founding Lessons: The

Removal Power and Joint Accountability, 47 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1563, 1566–67, 1582–85 (1997).

115. See Wood, supra note 109, at 412.
116. See Richard B. Morris, The American Revolution Reconsidered 152–57 (1967); Frederick W.

Marks III, Independence on Trial: Foreign Affairs and the Making of the Constitution, at
x–xv (1973); Felix Gilbert, To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign
Policy 66–75 (1961); Edward S. Corwin, National Supremacy: Treaty Power vs. State Power
21–30 (1913); Jack N. Rakove, Solving a Constitutional Puzzle: The Treatymaking Clause as a Case Study,
1 Persp. Am. Hist. 233, 267–69 (1984).

117. For example, the Constitution dealt with the problem of state treaty violations primarily through

making treaties “the supreme Law of the Land,” which is to say, enhancing judicial power. See U.S.
Const. art. VI, § 2; Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding,
and Treaties as “Supreme Law of the Land,” 99 Colum. L. Rev. 2095, 2122–23, 2125 (1999).

118. See Charles C. Thach, Jr., The Creation of the Presidency, 1775–1789: A Study in

Constitutional History 51–52 (1922).

119. See Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 106, at 644.
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specific evidence of special authority to interpret treaties to any greater extent than
the Constitution or federal statutes.
Among other things, the more general, functional approach to separation of
powers that conventional sources sustain better reveals the true potency of the
Marbury argument against deference. The point is not simply that it is the formal job
of the courts, rather than the executive, to interpret the law in a judicial setting. The
larger point, rather, is twofold. First, and implicit in the judicial function, remains
the courts’ role in providing a neutral forum for the vindication of individual claims,
particularly with regard to fundamental rights and particularly against the
government. Second, and no less potent, the courts’ insistence on this traditional role
serves the core function of preserving balance among the branches to ensure that
individual excesses do not become systemic.
B. Restoring Balance, Step One

None of this should appear novel. To the contrary, this analysis merely unpacks
Hamilton’s dictum that, “[t]he truth is, after all the declamations we have heard, that
the Constitution is itself, in every rational sense, and to every useful purpose, A
BILL OF RIGHTS.”120 This return to a more complete account of first principles
nonetheless results in two contemporary claims.
First, the competing functional goals central to separation of powers badly need
to be restored to modern separation of powers analysis in foreign affairs in such
newly contested areas as deference. Too often, such values as balance and the
Founders’ conception of accountability get lost in the face of the executive’s ostensible
expertise and efficiency in foreign affairs, other core values near and dear to
Hamilton’s heart. No less than Hamilton himself, however, each of the core purposes
that a conventional account of separation of powers restores requires reference and
consideration. Shorthand judicial references to Marbury simply do not suffice.
Second, separation of powers in its more completely restored, functional version
reaffirms the wisdom of the founding practice of zero deference. Consider simply the
core value of balance. Arguably the primus inter pares of all separation of powers
functions, concern about accretion of power in any one set of hands, two hundred
years into our history must focus on the executive as “the most dangerous branch,”
based simply on the growth of the President’s domestic authority during that time.121
This development, the executive’s practical increase in foreign affairs authority, and
the apparent founding practice against deference in treaty interpretation at a
minimum shift the burden onto those who would assert that changed circumstances
now cut in favor of augmenting presidential power.
Similar analysis holds true for the more complex, joint conception of accountability.
Recall here that the idea helps justify multi-branch involvement in an issue not simply
on the ground of formal governmental role, but further on the basis of ensuring a
more widespread and thorough conception of representativeness before particularly
120. The Federalist No. 84, at 515 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
121. See Flaherty, supra note 105, at 1816–19.
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bold initiatives can go forward. With regard to treaties, the conception of joint
accountability actually works to validate the practice of Senate reservations,
understandings, and declarations. Yet it also works against deference. Working
through this argument for present purposes would require an overlong detour into
admittedly contested thickets of constitutional theory. Suffice it to stipulate that
courts derive at least some measure of legitimacy from popular appointment and
reference to the nation’s evolving fundamental commitments as evidenced in
constitutional custom and practice.122 To the extent this is true, it affords an additional
reason for judges not to cede authority to either the President (or for that matter, the
Senate) in the implementation of treaties lest a more insulated, deliberative, yet
nonetheless democratic, form of consideration be eliminated from the process.
In addition, a fully restored approach to separation of powers does more than
counter certain sets of functional considerations against others. The particular
functional considerations, which a more thorough consideration of text, history, and
structure reveal, speak to more specific arguments for deference. Take, for example,
the ostensible analogy to Chevron. As noted, that analogy doctrinally rests on the
fiction of legislative delegation of interpretative and regulatory authority to the
executive through statutory ambiguity. The functional purposes of balance and joint
accountability bolster the arguments that this fiction be given credence narrowly,
and then only where executive processes mimic legislative deliberation, especially in
the area of foreign affairs where the executive is nowhere more potent. Likewise,
balance and accountability also put pressure on the Chevron analogy to the extent it
bases deference on the executive’s expertise outright. In this instance, the direct
confrontation of functions merely replay themselves, with balance in particular
directly countering expertise—a stalemate that at worst would preserve the Founding’s
zero deference approach, absent some compelling argument to the contrary.
IV.	Something New: Global Separation of Powers in a Globalized World

That “old-time” separation of powers should be enough to turn back any trend
toward deference. The balance of this essay, however, offers one more interpretation,
which is at once more original and potentially the most powerful. Call this separation
of powers in a global context—or “global separation of powers” for short. The premise
is straightforward. It assumes, first, that globalization generally has resulted in a net
gain in power not for judiciaries, but for the “political” branches—and above all, for
executives—within domestic legal systems. In other words, the growth of globalized
transnational government networks has yielded an imbalance among the three (to
four) major branches of government in terms of separation of powers. Such an
imbalance, among other things, poses a significant and growing threat for the
protection of individual rights by domestic courts, whether on the basis of international
or national norms.
122. For a recent and sophisticated attempt to elucidate the democratic basis of the judiciary’s role, see

Christopher L. Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government (2001). For a sympathetic rejoinder,
see Martin S. Flaherty, The Better Angels of Self-Government, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 1773, 1775 (2003).

138

VOLUME 56 | 2011/12

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

Yet if separation of powers analysis helps identify the problem, it also suggests
the solution. If globalization has comparatively empowered executives in particular,
it follows that fostering, rather than prohibiting, judicial globalization provides a
parallel approach to help restore the balance. In this way, judicial separation of
powers justifies judicial borrowing on both non-democratic and democratic grounds.
From a non democratic perspective, transnational judicial dialogue with reference to
international law and parallel comparative questions gives national judiciaries a
unique expertise on aspects of foreign affairs, and so is a further exception to the
usual presumption that the judiciary is the least qualified branch of government for
the purposes of foreign affairs. More importantly, from a democratic point of view,
restoring the balance that separation of powers seeks has the effect of promoting selfgovernment to the extent that separation of powers is itself seen as a predicate for any
well-ordered form of democratic self-government.
A. Globalization and Imbalance

Globalization, and the corollary erosion of sovereignty, may not yet be clichés,
but they are hardly news. As any human rights lawyer would be quick to point out,
the post–World War II emergence of international human rights law represents one
of the most profound assaults on the notion that state sovereigns are the irreducible,
impermeable building blocks of foreign affairs.123 But the nation-state model has
been eroding no less profoundly in less formal ways. Central, here, is the insight that
governments today no longer simply interact state to state, through heads of state,
foreign ministers, ambassadors, and consuls. Increasingly, if not already predominantly,
there is interaction through global networks in which subunits of governments deal
directly with one another. In separation of powers terms, executive branches at all
levels interact less as the sole representative of the nation, than as partners in
education ministries, intelligence agencies, or health and education initiatives.
Likewise, though lagging, legislators and committees from different jurisdictions
meet to share approaches and discuss common ways forward. Last, and least powerful
if not least dangerous, judges from different nations share approaches in conference,
teaching abroad programs, and of course, formally citing to one another in their
opinions. Only recently has pioneering work by Anne-Marie Slaughter, among
others, given a comprehensive picture of this facet of globalization.124 That work, in
turn, suggests that among the results of this process has been a net shift of domestic
power in any given state toward the executive and away from the judiciary and the
protection of fundamental rights.

123. Cf. Harold Hongju Koh, Complementarity on Human Rights Organizations in International Human

Rights/The Rise of Transnational Networks as the “Third Globalization,” 21 H.R.L.J. 307 (2000).

124. See Slaughter, supra note 7 (further developing her previous writings on this subject).
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1. Executive Globalization

Where international human rights lawyers seek to directly pierce the veil of state
sovereignty, international relations experts have chronicled the no less significant
desegregation of state sovereignty through the emergence of sub-governmental
networks. Nowhere has this process been more greatly marked than with regard to
the interaction of various levels of regulators within the executive branches—in
parliamentary systems, the “governments”125—of individual nations. Starting with
pioneering work by Robert Koehane and Joseph Nye,126 and more recently enhanced
and consolidated by Slaughter, current scholarship offers a multifaceted picture of
what may be termed “executive globalization.” That said, much work remains to be
done on how the “Global War on Terror” post-9/11 has accelerated this process with
regard to security agencies. Nor, on a more general level, has significant work been
done as to what the net effects of executive networking have been in separation of
powers terms. The following reviews what has been done and suggests the likely
answers to the questions that arise.
Slaughter, somewhat consciously overstating, terms government regulators who
associate with their counterparts abroad “the new diplomats.”127 This characterization
immediately raises the question of who they are and in what contexts they operate.
Perhaps ironically, desegregation begins at the top when presidents, prime ministers,
and heads of state gather in settings such as the G-8, not only as the representatives
of their states but as chief executives with common problems, which may include
dealing with other branches of their respective governments. Moving down the
ladder come an array of different specialists who meet across borders with one another
both formally and informally: central bankers, finance ministers, environmental
regulators, health officials, government educators, prosecutors, and—today perhaps
most importantly—military, security, and intelligence officials. The frameworks in
which these horizontal groups associate are various. One type of setting might be
transnational organizations under the aegis of the United Nations, the European
Union, NATO, or the WTO. Another framework can be networks that meet within
the structure of executive agreements, such as the Transatlantic Economic Partnership
of 1998. Other groups meet outside governmental frameworks, at least to begin with,
with examples ranging from the Basel Committee to the Financial Crime
Enforcement Network.128
As important as which executive officials currently cross borders is what they
actually do. The activities that make up executive transgovernmentalism may be
sliced in various ways.129 One breakdown divides the phenomenon into: (a)
125. Here, I note the perhaps telling convention that the executive in a parliamentary system is referred to as

the “government” rather than the “administration,” as in the United States.

126. See, e.g., Keohane & Nye, supra note 7.
127. Slaughter, supra note 7, at 36.
128. Slaughter, supra note 7, at 36–64.
129. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the

Future of International Law, 43 Va. J. Int’l L. 1 (2002).
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information networks; (b) harmonization networks; and (c) enforcement networks.130
An obvious yet vital activity, many government regulatory networks interact simply
to exchange relevant information and expertise. Such exchanges include brainstorming
on common problems, sharing information on identified challenges, banding together
to collect new information, and reviewing how one another’s agencies perform.131
Harmonization networks, which usually arise in settings such as the European Union
or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), entail relevant
administrators working together to fulfill the mandate of common regulations
pursuant to the relevant international instrument.132
For present purposes, however, enforcement networks most greatly implicate
separation of powers concerns precisely because they involve police and security
agencies sharing intelligence in specific cases, and, more generally, in capacity
building and training. In the context of Northern Ireland, the Royal Ulster
Constabulary (RUC) maintained “numerous links with other police services,
particularly with those in Britain, but also with North American agencies and others
elsewhere in the world . . . [including] the Federal Bureau of Investigation . . . .”133 In
a relatively benign vein, the Independent Police Commission charged with reforming
the RUC recommended further international contact, in part because “the
globalisation of crime requires police services around the world to collaborate with
each other more effectively and also because the exchange of best practice ideas
between police services will help the effectiveness of domestic policing.”134
It is exactly at this point, moreover, that 9/11-era concerns render the enforcement
aspect of executive globalization ever more salient, and often more ominous. To take
one example, consider the shadowy practice of “extraordinary renditions,” that is,
when the security forces of one country capture a person and send him or her to
another country where rough interrogation practices are likely to take place—all
outside the usual mechanisms of extradition.135 To this extent, transnational executive
cooperation moves from general, mutual bolstering to the expansion of one another’s
jurisdiction in the most direct and concrete fashion possible.
All this, in turn, suggests a profound shift in power to the executives in any given
nation state. At least in the United States, the conventional wisdom holds that the
executive branch has grown in power relative to Congress or the courts, not even
130. Id. at 10–27.
131. Id. at 28.
132. See Sydney A. Shapiro, International Trade Agreements, Regulatory Protection, and Public Accountability,

54 Admin. L. Rev. 435, 436–46 (2002).

133. The Indep. Comm’n for Policing in N. Ir., A New Beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland

101 (1999), http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/police/patten/patten99.pdf.

134. Id.
135. For a discussion of the practice with regard to international human rights law, see Comm. on Int’l

Human Rights, N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n & The Ctr. for Human Rights and Global Justice, NYU Sch. of Law,
Torture by Proxy: International and Domestic Law Applicable to “Extraordinary Renditions,” 60 Record.
13 (2005).
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counting the rise of administrative and regulatory agencies, even in purely domestic
terms.136 Add to the specter of enlarged executives worldwide who are enhancing one
another’s power, through information and enforcement networks in particular, and
the conclusion becomes presumptive. Add further the cooperation of executives in
light of 9/11, and the pro-executive implications of government globalization become
more troubling still.
		

2. Legislative Globalization

This pro-executive conclusion becomes even harder to resist given the slowness
with which national legislators have been interacting with their counterparts. Several
factors account for the slower pace of legislative globalization. Membership in a
legislature almost by definition entails not just representation but representation
keyed to national and subnational units. The turnover among legislators typically
outpaces either executive officials or, for that matter, judges. In further contrast to
legislators, regulators need to be specialists, and specialization facilitates cross-border
interaction if only because it is easier to identify counterparts and focus upon common
challenges.137
Transnational legislative networks exist nonetheless and are growing. To take
one example, national legislators have begun to work with one another in the context
of such international organizations as NATO, the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN). To take another example, independent legislative networks have begun to
emerge, such as the Inter-Parliamentary Union and Parliamentarians for Global
Action. 138
Yet even were national legislators to “catch up” to their executive counterparts in
any meaningful way, the result would not necessarily be more robust or adequate
protection of fundamental rights in times of perceived danger or the protection of
minority rights at any time. Human rights organizations around the world are all too
familiar with the democratic pathology of draconian statutes hastily enacted in
response to actual attacks or perceived threats, including the Prevention of Terrorism
Act in the United Kingdom, the USA PATRIOT Act in the United States, and the
Internal Security Act in Malaysia.139 It is for this reason that the essential player in
the matter of rights protection must remain the courts.

136. See Flaherty, supra note 105, at 1727–28.
137. Slaughter, supra note 7, at 104–06.
138. See id. at 104–30.
139. Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/2/

contents; USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); Internal Security Act 1960 (Act
No. 82) (Malay.), http://www.agc.gov.my/Akta/Vol.%202/Act%2082.pdf.
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3. Judicial Globalization

Several years ago, still Justice O’Connor visited Queen’s University Belfast to
participate in a summer academic program that also involved schools from the
Republic of Ireland and the United States. During the course of her visit, she was
able to meet with local leaders of the bench and bar and exchange experiences,
compare notes, and talk shop with her U.K. and Irish counterparts.140
This is but one facet of what Slaughter calls the “constructi[on of] a global legal
system” through both formal and informal transnational judicial networks.141 Such
judicial globalization, broadly conceived, occurs in several ways. The most mundane
yet potentially transformative ways are the increasing number of face-to-face meetings
through teaching, conferences, and more formal exchanges. Next, and directly tied
to classic economic globalization, courts of different nations have transformed the
idea of simple comity to coordination in tackling complex multi-national commercial
litigation. Of immense regional importance, the dialogue between the European
Court of Justice and national courts constitutes a more formal, horizontal aspect of
direct interaction among judiciaries.142
For the purposes of present analysis, however, by far the most important aspects
of judicial globalization involve national courts’ use of comparative materials and
international law—above all international human rights law. Ostensibly new and
controversial in the United States, this aspect of globalization is familiar in most other
jurisdictions. As noted, national, supreme, and appellate courts have with apparent
frequency cited to comparable case law in other jurisdictions as at least persuasive
authority to resolve domestic constitutional issues.143 Likewise, such courts also cite
with increasing frequency the human rights jurisprudence of such transnational
tribunals as the European Court of Human Rights and its Inter-American
counterpart.144 In spectacular fashion, the House of Lords has recently been doing
both.145 Likewise, the still-recent South African Constitution famously requires judges
interpreting its Bill of Rights to consult international law while expressly allowing

140. See Press Release, Queen’s Univ. Belfast, American Law School Visit to Queen’s (June 19, 2007),

available at http://www.qub.ac.uk/home/TheUniversity/GeneralServices/News/ArchivesPressReleasesCampusNews/2007PressReleases/06-2007PressReleases/#d.en.72245.

141. Slaughter, supra note 7, at 65. Slaughter has earlier written about this phenomenon extensively. See

Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 Va. J. Int’l L. 1103 (1999); Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Court to Court, 92 Am. J. Int’l L. 708 (1998).

142. Slaughter, supra note 7, at 82–99.
143. See, e.g., Catholic Comm’n for Justice and Peace in Zimb. v. Att’y Gen. of Zimb., 14 H.R.L.J. 323

(1993) (surveying comparative and international law in interpreting the Zimbabwean Constitution
regarding delay in application of the death penalty).

144. See, e.g., HKSAR v. Ng Kung Siu, [1999] 2 H.K.C. 10 (C.F.I.) (opinion of the Court of Appeal of Hong

Kong).
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them to consult “foreign,” i.e., comparative, law.146 So marked is the phenomenon that
several comparative constitutional law casebooks that highlight such borrowing have
carved out a significant market niche, even in the United States.147
It follows that in all these ways the global interaction of judges strengthens their
hands within their respective countries. In both theory and in the substance of these
interactions, the bolstering of judiciaries generally works toward a greater protection
of individual and minority rights. But while leading authorities view judicial
globalization as outpacing its legislative counterpart, so too do they describe a world
in which executive and regulatory interaction outpaces them all.
To this extent, judicial globalization helps identify a problem, yet also suggests a
solution. The problem, simply, is that transgovernmental globalization taken as a
whole draws power to national executive branches and away from rights-protecting
judiciaries. Against this problem, the solution is to foster the judicial side of the
phenomenon, particularly with regard to the use of comparative and international
materials.
B. Restoring Balance Redux

The true potency of global separation of powers analysis, however, lies elsewhere.
To its proponents, deference follows from the executive branch’s ostensibly greater
expertise in foreign relations at a time when foreign relations is becoming ever more
important. Yet global separation of powers suggests that this school of jurisprudential
thought has it exactly backward. The substantial recent international relations
scholarship describes the emergence of transgovermental networks on a global
scale.148 This work suggests, though has yet to explore, the comparative institutional
results in any given state. The overwhelming evidence nonetheless suggests that the
primary comparative beneficiary of the modern disaggregated state has been the
executive.
Given this development, transgovernmental globalization violates the core tenets
of separation of powers doctrine in any given country. These tenets have long made
separation of powers in some form a predicate for properly functioning democratic
self-government. First and foremost, separation of powers theory promises balance
among the major branches of government to prevent a tyrannical accretion of power
in any one. In the United States, the founding generation prized this facet of the
doctrine above all else. And though they viewed the “most dangerous” branch as the
legislature, subsequent history has clearly established the executive as the greatest
threat to the type of balance that separation of powers presupposes.149 Beyond this,
the American Founders also believed that separation of powers could facilitate
146. S. Afr. Const. § 39(1)(b)–(c) 1996.
147. See, e.g., Victoria C. Jackson & Mark V. Tushnet, Comparative Constitutional Law (2d ed.

2006); Norman Dorsen & Michel Rosenfeld et al., Comparative Constitutionalism (2003).

148. See supra text accompanying footnotes 123–41.
149. See The Federalist No. 48, at 309 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); Flaherty, supra note

105, at 1810–39.
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democracy not simply by preserving liberty, but by widely dispersing democratic
accountability.150 For this reason they ensured that all three branches of government
had a direct or indirect democratic provenance: the House of Representatives through
direct elections; the Senate initially through election by the state legislatures; the
President through the Electoral College; and not least, the judiciary through
presidential appointment and senatorial approval.151 Of course not all liberal
democracies, especially in the parliamentary mode, follow the U.S. model in these
and other specifics. At a more general and no less relevant level, they nonetheless do
follow the idea that an independent judiciary, itself at least indirectly accountable,
serves as a check on behalf of individual rights against too great concentrations of
power in the legislature and executive in the service of energetic government. Not
only is this idea commonly evident in democratic constitutions, it also is expressed in
various international human rights instruments.152
Whether reversing the present trend toward foreign affairs deference will suffice
to redress the imbalance may be an open question. But to paraphrase Justice Jackson
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, courts concerned with separation of powers
should be the last, not the first, to bow to the increasingly powerful executive that
globalization promotes.153
V. Judicial Foreign Affairs Authority and the 9/11 Cases

The 9/11 cases demonstrate that the Court can still stand up to the President in
foreign relations when directed by law. Striking enough were the defeats handed the
executive in a time of threat, fear, and panic. Notable as well were the rejections of
foreign relations deference across the board, whether involving statutes in Rasul,
treaties in Hamdan, or the Constitution in Hamdi and Boumediene. The Court
reasserted itself, moreover, fully aware of the stakes. In each case the executive called
upon the Court to defer to its foreign relations authority, marshalling the various
arguments that have gained increasing currency over the past century. Each time the
Court reverted to its historic form and offered zero deference.
Yet on closer review, a certain “nuance”154 tempers the Court’s boldness. As many
commentators have noted, the Court’s post-9/11 decisions reflected deep divisions
150. See Flaherty, supra note 105, at 1767–68, 1821–26; Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of

Checks and Balances: The Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 161, 212 (1994).

151. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 1, art. I, § 3, cl. 1, art. II, § 1, cl. 2, art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
152. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 21, U.N. Doc. A/

RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).

153. 343 U.S. 579, 655 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson famously declared:

With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for
long preserving free government except that the Executive be under the [rule of] law, and
that the law be made by parliamentary deliberations. Such institutions may be destined to
pass away. But it is the duty of the Court to be last, not first, to give them up.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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among the Justices.155 As others have pointed out, the judgments did not actually
result in concrete relief for the detainees challenging the government’s policies.156
More to the point, the Court may not have deferred to the executive’s interpretations,
but neither did it expressly reject deference per se. In some cases, the majority simply
ignored the doctrine altogether, leaving it to the dissenting Justices to rail about its
de facto rejection. In other decisions, the majority followed Youngstown and partly
rested its determination on Congress’s failure to authorize the executive’s actions.
These bases are fine as far as they go, but they do not go far enough either to
afford the 9/11 judgments the security they need to prevent a rollback and still less to
permit the judiciary to assume its intended role in a globalized age. As an initial
matter, the Court should face deference head on. And when it does, it should draw
upon precisely the arguments sketched out in this essay. This means first referring
back to the Founders’ conception of the Court’s foreign relations role. Yet it should
also mean looking to current and ongoing developments in international relations
that challenge the balance among the branches that separation of powers demands.
What follows suggests how the 9/11 cases did not do this but could have.
A. Statutes: Rasul

The first 9/11 case to reach the Supreme Court pitted judicial authority against
judicial deference with regard to statutory interpretation. Rasul involved the claims
of fourteen persons captured during the war in Afghanistan and detained at the U.S.
Naval base at Guantánamo Bay.157 The detainees all sought relief under, among other
provisions, the federal habeas corpus statute.158 As all sides made clear, the sole
question came to be whether that statute extended beyond the sovereign territory of
the United States to Guantánamo.159
The executive argued a strenuous “no.” The solicitor general primarily based this
on the Court’s decision in Johnson v. Eisentrager,160 which declined to extend habeas
jurisdiction to German nationals captured in China during World War II, tried by
military commission, and held by the U.S. military at a base in Germany.161 Reliance
on Eisentrager, among other things, would have required the Court to overlook the
155. See Flaherty, supra note 25, at 51.
156. See John Yoo, Courts at War, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 573, 575, 579–81 (2006); Mark A. Drumbl,

Guantánamo, Rasul, and the Twilight of Law, 53 Drake L. Rev. 897, 903–04 (2005).

157. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470–71 (2004).
158. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2243 (2006).
159. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343), 2004
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factual differences between the case and the Guantánamo detentions, as well as the
subsequent interpretations of the habeas statute, arguably keying less on the physical
location of the petitioner.
Yet the President’s lawyers did not stop at the merits, or at least the specific
merits, of the habeas statute. They also sought refuge not just in judicial deference,
but judicial self-abnegation. In this regard the government first made the ritual
prefatory contention that “[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is
committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative—‘the political’—
Departments.”162 It continued that during armed hostilities, the Commander-in-Chief
Clause made the commitment to the executive in particular that much stronger. It
followed, therefore, that what the Constitution gives to the executive, it takes away
from the courts. “Exercising jurisdiction over habeas actions filed on behalf of
Guantanamo detainees would directly interfere with the Executive’s conduct of the
military campaign against al-Qaeda and its supporters.”163 From here the consequences
of judicial intervention grew more dire. Entertaining claims from Guantánamo
would extend jurisdiction of U.S. courts to habeas petitions filed on behalf of aliens
captured or detained on the battlefield in Afghanistan, or anywhere in the world.
Simple review of Guantánamo claims would be enough to “thrust the federal courts
into the extraordinary role of . . . superintending the Executive’s conduct of an armed
conflict . . . .”164
Three Justices agreed. Writing for Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas,
Justice Scalia wrote a dissent that devoted even more comparative attention than the
solicitor general to Eisentrager and arguments that it controlled. The dissent’s coda
nonetheless made clear that doubts about the courts’ fitness to meddle in foreign
affairs resonated. The majority’s analysis, Scalia declared, “ought to be unthinkable
when . . . [it] . . . has a potentially harmful effect upon the Nation’s conduct of a
war.”165 As if that were not plain enough, he concluded, “[f]or this Court to create
such a monstrous scheme in time of war, and in frustration of our military
commanders’ reliance upon clearly stated prior law, is judicial adventurism of the
worst sort.”166
Establishing a pattern for all the 9/11 cases, the majority rejected deference, yet
did so almost passively. Justice Stevens devoted most of his opinion to the specific
merits of habeas. Mainly he noted that “[p]etitioners in these cases differ from the
Eisentrager detainees in important respects.”167 Specifically,
[t]hey are not nationals of countries at war with the United States, and they
deny that they have engaged in or plotted acts of aggression against the

162. Id. at *41 (quoting Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918)).
163. Id. at *42.
164. Id. at *43.
165. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 506 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 476.
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United States; they have never been afforded access to any tribunal, much less
charged with and convicted of wrongdoing; and for more than two years they
have been imprisoned in territory over which the United States exercises
exclusive jurisdiction and control.168

Freed from Eisentrager, the Court affirmatively asserted that later habeas decisions
held “that the prisoner’s presence within the territorial jurisdiction of the district
court is not ‘an invariable prerequisite’ to the exercise of district court jurisdiction
under the federal habeas statute.”169 Instead,
because “the writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks
relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful
custody,” a district court acts “within [its] respective jurisdiction” within the
meaning of § 2241 as long as “the custodian can be reached by service of
process.170

What the Court did not do was acknowledge, much less address, the arguments
against the courts asserting their authority to interpret statutes that bear a significant
impact on foreign affairs.
Yet the Court could have done exactly this. Rather than sidestep the issue, the
majority first might have reiterated the historical foundations for its intervention.
Any historical case would have to begin with more than just half the story behind
separation of powers, let alone the lesser half. At a general, functional level, the
Founding generation did agree that a key function of dividing government authority
was the type of efficiency borne of specialization. It followed that the President and
Congress would be best suited to set policy across the board, including foreign
relations. It even followed further that the executive would enjoy a comparative
institutional advantage in responding to national security emergencies. Efficiency,
however, was not the only nor the primary function envisioned for the doctrine. If
any one purpose had primacy, it was the prevention of tyranny by preventing too
great a concentration of power into “the impetuous vortex” 171 of any branch of
government. The executive’s greater decisiveness and f lexibility justifies, among
other things, its grant of Commander-in-Chief authority, power to recognize
governments, and further powers that may be implied for these express authorizations.
But in just the same way, the judiciary, in explicating the law where it has jurisdiction
and more generally in its role as a neutral arbiter of rights, vests within itself an
exclusive power to adjudicate the scope of a remedial statute free and clear from any
special concern for the executive’s views.
Nor did the Founders tailor these fundamentals for cases involving foreign affairs.
Instead, they envisaged the courts as key players in the new nation’s quest for

168. Id.
169. Id. at 478 (quoting Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 495 (1973)).
170. Id. at 478–79 (quoting Braden, 410 U. S. at 494–95).
171. The Federalist No. 48, supra note 149, at 309.
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international respect. In this regard, the well-known case of Little v. Barreme 172
reflects earlier Founding views with specific reference to statutes. In Little, the Court
considered a capture of a suspected American merchant ship named the Flying Fish
by the frigate USS Boston during the so-called “quasi-war” with France. An Act of
Congress authorized the President to instruct naval commanders to inspect and seize
any suspected vessel sailing to a French port.173 President Adams, however, construed
the Act to empower him to have American ships seized whether they were going to
or coming from French ports. Following these orders, the Boston seized the Flying
Fish, even though it was coming from a French island. Writing for the Court, Chief
Justice Marshall had no difficulty holding that the capture was not authorized,
despite a “construction of the act of congress made by the department to which its
execution was assigned”—a construction, moreover, “much better calculated to give
it effect.”174 Where Marshall paused at all, it was to consider whether the Boston’s
captain might have some sort of immunity from damages for following a presidential
interpretation, but he declined even to do this.175 Consistent with the Founding, in
short, the Chief Justice gave zero deference to a federal statute authorizing military
action and applied during a period of armed hostilities.
Looking forward, the Little Court might also have predicted out that the bases
for its foreign affairs role would grow stronger, not weaker. Even under George
Washington, the eighteenth-century executive was infinitely weaker in relation to
the other branches than its modern counterpart.176 Even then, this comparative
weakness did not mean that the Court would grant the President any special leeway
when it determined that a matter fell within the judicial power. As Little indicates,
the judiciary instead would accord the executive zero deference in statutory
interpretation, even when the statute dealt with what was then the nation’s only real
instrument of national defense, the U.S. Navy, in an armed naval conflict.
Today the executive’s comparative power has increased exponentially, making the
prima facie case for a strong judicial check correspondingly stronger. Many of the
domestic sources for increased presidential power mentioned as long ago as Youngstown
continue to flourish, including the concentration of authority in a single head, access
to media, and the role of the President as head of his or her party.177 Add to this the
further effects of foreign relations. Globalization today works to comparatively
enhance executive authority throughout the world, including the United States. This
equation gains a multiplier effect once national security becomes the occasion for
executives around the world to cooperate. The facts of Rasul itself provide a telling
172. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
173. An Act Further to Suspend the Commercial Intercourse Between the United States and France, and the

Dependencies Thereof, 1 Stat. 578 (expired), available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?
collId=llsl&fileName=001/llsl001.db&recNum=701.

174. Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 178.
175. Id. at 179.
176. See Flaherty, supra note 105, at 1810–28.
177. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653–54 (1952).
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illustration. There, the armed forces of the United States, in the course of a war
given only the most general authorization by Congress, teamed up with irregular
insurgent forces within Afghanistan to detain hundreds of enemy combatants where
the likelihood of misidentification was substantial.178 This assertion of joint executive
authority provides all the more reason for the judiciary to assert its checking function
against the concentration of too much power in any single branch. The conclusion
follows with that much greater force when the specific check is the judiciary’s core
role of interpreting statutes that set forth remedies for the violation of fundamental
rights. Otherwise, the central purpose underlying separation of powers would survive
merely at the sufferance of the President’s claims in foreign affairs.
B. Treaties: Hamdan

Hamdan repeated the story told in Rasul, only this time with regard to treaties.
In particular, the contest between judicial and executive interpretation turned on the
Third Geneva Convention as incorporated into domestic law by the UCMJ. This
issue arose in light of President George W. Bush’s decision to try certain Guantánamo
detainees in special military commissions rather than in civilian courts or courtsmartial. Among the first slated to go on trial was Salim Ahmed Hamdan, who was
seized in Afghanistan, turned over to the U.S. military, and ultimately charged with
“conspiracy ‘to commit offenses . . . triable by military commission,’” namely
“attacking civilians; attacking civilian objects; murder by an unprivileged belligerent;
and terrorism.”179 Thanks to Rasul, Hamdan countered with a habeas petition that
among other things claimed that the commissions violated basic procedural
protections as set forth in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.
The executive disagreed, strongly. The first argument asserted that any treaty
claim that Hamdan might have was not justiciable. On the executive’s view, the
Geneva Conventions did not create judicially enforceable remedies. Relying in part
on Eisentrager, the President’s lawyers contended that the Conventions were properly
read as leaving enforcement to diplomatic representations between governments
instead of by domestic courts.180 On this point the Court in Hamdan was bound, not
just because of its own ostensible precedent in Eisentrager, but because of the deference
it owed the executive in treaty interpretation:
178. Seton Hall Law School’s Center for Policy and Research has done extensive research and analysis

concerning the detainees held in Guantánamo based upon evidence presented at proceedings before the
Combat Status Review Tribunals, which are the bodies set up to establish that those individuals held in
detention qualify as “unlawful enemy combatants.” The reports that the center has issued have indicated
that the evidence for this designation is meager or non existent in the vast majority of instances. See
Mark Denbeaux et al., Seton Hall Law Ctr. for Policy and Research, The Meaning of
“Battlefield”: An Analysis of the Government’s Representations of “Battlefield” Capture
and “Recidivism” of the Guantánamo Detainees 2 (Dec. 10, 2007), http://law.shu.edu/
publications/guantanamoReports/meaning_of_battlefield_final_121007.pdf.

179. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 566, 605 (2006) (quoting Appendix to Brief for Petitioner at 65a,

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184)).

180. Brief for Respondents, supra note 27, at 30–34.
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As this Court noted in Eisentrager, a contrary construction of the Geneva
Convention would severely encumber the President’s authority as Commander
in Chief. Indeed, petitioner’s argument suggests that the hundreds of
thousands of POWs held by the United States in this country during World
War II were entitled to enforce the 1929 version of the Convention through
private legal actions in our courts. The Executive Branch’s construction of
the Convention avoids such absurd consequences and is entitled to “great
weight.”181

With the Court’s reading of the treaty established, the President argued further that
no domestic enactment rendered Geneva Convention rights judicially enforceable,
including the UCMJ and the Habeas Act.182
Next, the President argued that “[e]ven if the Geneva Convention were judicially
enforceable, it is inapplicable to the ongoing conflict with al Qaeda.”183 This result
followed thanks to a Catch-22 created by his interpretation of the Convention. On
one hand, “[t]he President has determined that the Geneva Convention does not
‘apply to our conflict with al Qaeda in Afghanistan or elsewhere throughout the
world because, among other reasons, al Qaeda is not a High Contracting Party to
[the Convention].’”184 Since al-Qaeda was a terrorist organization, rather than a
sovereign state capable of signing and ratifying the treaty, the President further
determined that neither al-Qaeda nor its members could claim the protections the
treaty provided. Yet on the other hand, the provision that appeared to address
conf licts involving non-state actors did not do so either. Or so the President
determined. As the solicitor general also noted:
“Pursuant to [his] authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive of
the United States,” the President has “accept[ed] the legal conclusion of the
Department of Justice . . . that common Article 3 of Geneva does not apply
to . . . al Qaeda . . . detainees, because, among other reasons, the relevant
conflicts are international in scope and common Article 3 applies only to
‘armed conflict not of an international character.’”185

These particular executive interpretations, if anything, demanded even greater
deference. The executive’s initial claim was that they were beyond the judicial review
at all. This somewhat bold contention rested variously on the President’s war powers,
on general foreign affairs authority, and on analogies to executive authority to
recognize governments and determine when governments have ratified treaties.186
Less bold, but still sweeping, the President contended that even if courts could review
181. Id. at 34 (citation omitted); see United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989); Sumitomo Shoji Am.,

Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184–85 (1982).

182. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 716–17.
183. Brief for Respondents, supra note 27, at 37.
184. Brief for Respondents, supra note 27, at 38.
185. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 718 (citation omitted).
186. Brief for Respondents, supra note 27, at 37–38.
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these determinations, “the standard of review would surely be extraordinarily
deferential to the President.”187
As in Rasul, arguments for self-abnegation registered among certain Justices in
dissent. Justice Thomas, writing for Justices Scalia and Alito, agreed on the merits
that Eisentrager settled whether the Geneva Conventions provided for domestic
judicial remedies.188 He also agreed that even if the Court’s precedent hadn’t settled
the matter, a fresh review of the treaty would lead to the same conclusion.189 Finally,
the dissent accepted the government’s argument that the UCMJ did not render the
Convention’s provisions judicially enforceable.190 Justice Thomas recorded even
stronger agreement with the executive on deference. As he put it:
Under this Court’s precedents, “the meaning attributed to treaty provisions
by the Government agencies charged with their negotiation and enforcement
is entitled to great weight.” Our duty to defer to the President’s understanding of
the provision at issue here is only heightened by the fact that he is acting pursuant to
his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and by the fact that the
subject matter of Common Article 3 calls for a judgment about the nature
and character of an armed conflict.191

Once again, the majority rejected the executive’s views, though, once more, not
as such. In a lengthy opinion, Justice Stevens, among other things, made clear that
the President’s military tribunals violated Hamdan’s rights under Common Article 3
as incorporated by the UCMJ. To get to this conclusion, the majority first rejected
the argument that Eisentrager controlled and, in particular, Eisentrager’s observation
that the Geneva Conventions did not confer a right to enforce its provisions in
domestic courts. The Court nonetheless assumed without deciding that the
Conventions did not act as an independent source of domestic law binding the
government and conferring enforceable rights.192 The rights that the Conventions set
forth, however, were part of the customary international laws of war, and the Court
interpreted the UCMJ as conditioning the authority to create military commissions
on compliance with that body of law.193

187. Id. at 38.
188. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 716–17 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 488–89 (2004)

(Scalia, J., dissenting).

189. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 717–19 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
190. See id. at 678, 718–19.
191. Id. at 718–19 (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,

299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).

192. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 628. Even here, however, the Court dropped a “but see” footnote referencing a

brief submitted by the late Louis Henkin and other law professors noting that the International
Committee of the Red Cross had early on indicated that “[i]t should be possible in States which are
parties to the Convention . . . for the rules of the Convention . . . to be evoked before an appropriate
national court by the protected person who has suffered a violation.” Id. at 628 n.58.

193. Id. at 628.
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This reasoning meant the Court had to face the Convention directly. Here the
majority quickly passed by the President’s argument that the Convention applied
only to forces fighting for “High Contracting Parties” under Article 2 and that
al-Qaeda did not qualify. “We need not decide the merits of this argument because
there is at least one provision of the Geneva Conventions that applies here even if the
relevant conflict is not one between signatories”—Common Article 3.194 The Court
made this determination by properly rejecting an argument accepted by the D.C.
Circuit and maintained by the executive. That position read the Article’s introductory
wording, which states that it applies to “armed conf lict not of an international
character,” as not covering conflict with al-Qaeda given that the global “War on
Terrorism” clearly crosses national borders.195 Justice Stevens rejected this reasoning
on several bases. First, he noted that the structure of the Conventions was best
understood as providing a high level of protection for combatants of classical state vs.
state conflicts, yet in addition accorded minimum fundamental rights for participants
in conflicts falling short of traditional wars.196 Second, the majority noted that the
use of the term “international” was a term of art literally applying to actions between
nation states. It followed that conflict between the United States and a terrorist
organization was not of an “international character” in this sense. 197 Finally, the
Court relied on the International Committee of the Red Cross’s Commentaries,
which confirmed the Court’s interpretation.198
Having concluded, contrary to the executive, that Common Article 3 applied,
the Court found a violation, and Justice Stevens, writing for a plurality, found
another. The majority held that the military commissions proposed by President
Bush ran afoul of the provision’s requirement that detainees receive sentences only
from “a regularly constituted court.”199 The Court reasoned that the commissions
were not regularly constituted on the strength of its conclusion that the UCMJ
prohibited them on the record before it, which was also a discrete and independent
basis for the Court’s judgment. Under Article 36(b) of the UCMJ “all rules and
regulations” that the President may prescribe for military courts “shall be uniform
insofar as is practicable.”200 On the majority’s view, this requirement meant that the
procedures for courts martial and commissions had to be uniform unless the President
194. Id. at 629.
195. Id. at 718, 724 (quoting Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,

1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316).

196. Id. at 562.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 619–20.
199. Id. at 630, 631–33. As the Court points out, Article 3(1)(d) prohibits “the passing of sentences and the

carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.” Id. at
630 (quoting Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, ¶ 1(d), Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316).

200. 10 U.S.C. § 836, art. 36(b) (2006).
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made some showing that the substantial divergence between the two was objectively
impracticable. Since the President did not, the commissions were unauthorized under
the UCMJ. 201 The Court took this position, moreover, notwithstanding the
President’s strenuous statutory argument that Article 36(a) merely set out a subjective
standard to be determined by the President, an argument to which the majority
accorded deference.202 Given its reading of the statute, it followed that unauthorized
commissions could not be considered regularly constituted for the purposes of the
Convention.203
Justice Stevens found one more violation of Common Article 3, but here he lost
Justice Kennedy and thus the majority. Where they parted company turned on
Common Article 3’s additional requirement that even regularly constituted courts
must afford “all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples.”204 Stevens, now writing for only Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, determined that the commissions lacked a number of indispensable
procedures, including the right to be tried in one’s presence and the right to be
apprised of all incriminating evidence.205 Justice Kennedy did not necessarily disagree
at the first instance. He nonetheless expressed the belief that the appellate review
201. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 620–25.
202. Brief for Respondents, supra note 27, at 44–45.
203. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 632.
204. Common Article 3 reads, in full:

In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory
of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to
apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:

1.	Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by
sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be
treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour,
religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end
the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place
whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:

		
		
		
		

(a)	Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation,
cruel treatment and torture;
(b)	Taking of hostages;

(c)	Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading
treatment;

(d)	T he passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all
the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples.

2.	The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An impartial
humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may
offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 3, ¶¶ 1–2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316.
205. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 633, 634–35 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
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provided for commission judgments would cure any problems created by the lack of
essential procedural safeguards at the trial level.206 Once more, both the Stevens
plurality and the Kennedy opinion rejected a contrary reading of the treaty put
forward by the executive. 207 Once again, however, they simply set out their legal
reasoning rather than rejecting deference expressly.
Echoing Rasul, this lost opportunity counts against Hamdan, however laudable
the decision is generally. Perhaps even more richly than with statutes, the Founding
provides the Court with a compelling basis to justify its independent review of treaty
provisions in the face of insistent constructions put forth by the President. More
generally, the same functional commitments apply as fully with international
agreements as they do statutes. Certainly, efficiency—or as Hamilton put it, “secrecy
and dispatch”—applied to the making of treaties in particular. For this reason the
Convention transferred the power to negotiate treaties from the Senate to the
President, and the too-large House was to get out of the process altogether. Yet
balance still remained a primary goal. To further this purpose, the Founders, among
other things, included the requirement that two-thirds of the senators present
approve before a treaty could go into effect. Despite what might be thought today,
this supermajority proviso did not have much to do with addressing an ostensible
“democratic deficit” left by excluding the House. Rather, it had nearly everything to
do with the fear that the President could combine with a regional block of senators to
undermine the rights and interests of a particular part of the country—in particular,
the northeastern states’ using their majority to protect their fishing rights in the
Atlantic at the expense of giving away navigation rights on the Mississippi, which
were essential to the prosperity of the growing Southwest. In these ways, the
Founding commitment to separation of powers to prevent a tyrannical accretion of
power in the government was both manifest and self-conscious in a core area of
foreign affairs.208
The same concern applies more specifically to the role of the courts. One of the
central problems leading to the Federal Convention was the failure of the U.S.
government in maintaining its treaty commitments. In particular, the new nation
could not enforce key undertakings in the 1783 Treaty of Paris with the United
Kingdom that ended the Revolution. Of special concern were the American
undertakings first to insure compensation for loyalists whose property had been
confiscated during the war and, second, to prevent the states from impeding British
creditors from making good on their valid claims. With no direct power to legislate,
the national government had to rely on the states, many of which blithely ignored the
obligation to pass any measures protecting such unpopular groups. The solution was
the Supremacy Clause’s provision making treaties “the supreme Law of the Land,”
or, in modern parlance, “self-executing.”209 The no less manifest corollary to this
206. Id. at 636, 653–55 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
207. Brief for Respondents, supra note 27, at 49–50.
208. See Flaherty, supra note 117, at 2118.
209. Id. at 2120–51.
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decision was that it would fall to the courts, above all the federal courts, to make
good on individuals’ treaty claims when government officials would not. In the first
instance, resistance came, as expected, from state officials leading to several landmark
Supreme Court decisions.210 As professor Sloss has shown, it also came from the
federal executive, and when it did, the Justices gave no additional weight to the
President’s views anymore than it did to those of state officials. 211
Looking forward, the effects of globalization also apply as fully with regard to
treaties as statutes; perhaps more so. First, again as a general matter, the ties that
executives around the world have been able to forge have outstripped those made by
their legislative and judicial counterparts. This broad pattern would be reason enough
for courts to maintain their authority because rather than despite particular cases
having foreign relations implications. For this reason, judicial authority to interpret
treaties becomes even more important insofar as this source of law usually deals with
foreign relations matters more directly and more often than with statutes and because,
in the international context, agreements frequently furnish the primary check on
executive action. The stakes become only that much higher when national security
and individual rights are implicated.
As with Rasul, Hamdan provides a telling illustration. There, executive officials
from different states worked together outside the usual checks of domestic law to
capture an individual who would be indefinitely detained and made subject to an
attempted trial before an irregular court. Hamdan himself landed in Guantánamo
after being captured by Afghan militia forces, who then turned him over to the U.S.
military. The justification for deeming the resulting detention and trial outside the
usual checks was that the capture took place in the course of a war. Yet it is exactly
this claim that shows the dangers of globalization in the national security context.
First, while the war in Afghanistan might end, captures in the new “War on Terror”
may continue as long as the threat of terrorism exists, which is to say, without end.
To face this threat, executives around the world will continue to cooperate to detain
suspected terrorists and place them in specialized courts wherever and whenever they
can find them. In this context, the primary source for the rule of law comes from
treaties such as the Geneva Conventions. Given this role, it would come as no surprise
that an executive such as that which existed in the Bush administration would
interpret the resulting strictures either as not applicable or not meaningful. It should,
however, be shocking for the courts to cede their authority to interpret treaties as any
other body of law. To do so would be to take one of the quickest paths to undermine
separation of powers given the realities of modern international relations.

210. See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796) (discussing a treaty between Great Britain and the

United States regarding collection of debts on foreign soil and a state legislature’s failure to collect a
debt on behalf of Great Britain); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (establishing
the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state supreme court decisions and adjudicating a land
title dispute between the estate of a British citizen and a citizen of the State of Virginia).

211. Sloss, supra note 35, at 498–99.
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C. Constitution: Hamdi

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 212 which was decided between Rasul and Hamdan, represents
a culmination of all three cases by most directly addressing the Constitution. The
case arose when Yaser Hamdi, an American citizen, was captured by members of the
Northern Alliance in Afghanistan and turned over to the U.S. military.213 Unlike
Rasul, he was transferred from Guantánamo to a naval brig within the United States
once the government discovered that he was a U.S. citizen. Like Rasul, however,
Hamdi was designated an “enemy combatant” and so subject to indefinite detention.
Hamdi’s father filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus claiming, among other
things, that he had a right under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to contest
the factual basis for his detention through a hearing.214 In the course of its response,
the executive attached a declaration from Michael Mobbs, special advisor to the
under secretary of defense for policy, which asserted that Hamdi had been affiliated
with a Taliban military unit, had remained with it after the attacks of 9/11, and had
been with the unit when it surrendered to the Northern Alliance, at which point he
surrendered his Kalishnikov assault rifle.215
The Court granted certiorari on two potentially constitutional questions. The
first dealt with Hamdi’s challenge to the executive’s authority to detain citizens as
“enemy combatants.” A majority held that the detention was authorized. Justice
O’Connor’s plurality opinion, however, relied on Authorization of the Use of Military
Force (AUMF). For this reason, the plurality did not have to address the executive’s
argument “that no explicit congressional authorization is required, because the
Executive possesses plenary authority to detain pursuant to Article II of the
Constitution.”216 With detention established, there remained the second question:
“What process is constitutionally due to a citizen who disputes his enemy-combatant
status?”217 Here the Court did grapple with the constitutional issue and, with it, the
question of judicial deference.
As ever, the President’s lawyers argued against the courts having any meaningful
role. In Rasul, that meant reading a statute consistent with the executive’s concerns
given its constitutional role in foreign relations. In Hamdan, the argument went
further to assert that the courts should bow to the President’s interpretation of treaties
given the President’s greater ostensible expertise in dealing with this type of law.
With Hamdi, the executive rang still another change. Here the White House argued
that the Constitution itself acknowledged the President’s greater institutional capacity
in foreign affairs, especially in the context of national security. In the circumstances,
two arguments followed. First, the President alone had ample authority to detain
212. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
213. Id. at 510 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion).
214. Id. at 510–11.
215. Id. at 512–13.
216. Id. at 516.
217. Id. at 524.
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Hamdi and therefore anyone else he deemed in some way associated with the 9/11
attacks. Second, separation of powers principles meant that the courts had to accept
the President’s determination of who constituted an “enemy combatant.”
The President’s first claim came more at the expense of Congress than the courts.
As the solicitor general put it, it was simply “incorrect” that Congress alone had the
power to authorize the detention of captured enemy combatant who is an American
citizen.218 Rather, “[e]specially in the case of foreign attack, the President’s authority
to wage war is not dependent on ‘any special legislative authority.’”219 In fairness, the
President’s legal team was not so bold as to argue superior institutional capacity in
interpreting the Constitution, which would have been a bold (though not
unprecedented) argument in light of Marbury. In this sense, the executive’s contention
did not go as far as it did in Hamdan concerning treaties or arguably Rasul with regard
to statutes. The President quickly went on to point out that Congress had affirmed
his authority to detain in any case through the AUMF.220 Even so, the argument for
executive authority to detain free and clear of Congress had been asserted.
The second main claim took aim at the judiciary more directly and asserted that
separation of powers principles compelled it to defer to the executive’s factual
determinations plain and simple. The solicitor general reminded the Court that it
had observed that “‘courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the
authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs,’” and further that
“‘[m]atters intimately related to foreign policy and national security are rarely proper
subjects for judicial intervention.’” 221 The basis for judicial restraint rested in
institutional capacity, namely the military’s “unmatched vantage point from which to
learn about the enemy and make judgments as to whether those seized during a
conflict are friend or foe.”222 The President’s lawyers did make the apparent concession
that while factual determinations muted judicial review, a habeas challenge would
give the courts the opportunity to consider challenges concerning the executive’s
authority to act. As they put it, “[r]espect for separation of powers and the limited
institutional capabilities of courts in matters of military decisionmaking in connection
with an ongoing conflict may well limit courts to the consideration of legal attacks
on the detention of captured enemy combatants . . . .” 223 Of course, in Rasul and
Hamdan the executive went on to argue that the President’s legal determinations also
commanded deference.
Once more, the executive’s arguments met with some support on the Court,
though only in dissent and, in this instance, only in the lone effort of Justice Thomas.
The opinion nonetheless sets out the case for judicial deference to the executive in
218. Brief for the Respondents at 19, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696).
219. Id. (quoting The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1862)).
220. Id. at 20.
221. Id. at 25 (citation omitted).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 26.

158

VOLUME 56 | 2011/12

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

almost its purest form. Thomas argued that, once authorized by the Constitution or
Congress to take a particular action dealing with national security, the President
may make the factual determinations necessary to take that action free and clear of
any oversight by the courts—all on grounds of institutional capacity. As he made the
point: “This detention falls squarely within the Federal Government’s war powers,
and we lack the expertise and capacity to second-guess that decision.”224 The dissent
came to this conclusion by focusing entirely on the capabilities of the “unitary
executive” in foreign affairs. Here Justice Thomas proceeded from the well-worn
premise that the Constitution’s structure aimed to create an energetic executive
ref lecting the “decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch” that characterizes an
individual rather than a group.225 “These structural advantages are most important in
the national-security and foreign-affairs contexts.”226 Congress, Thomas conceded,
does have an important role in these realms. “But,” he added, “it is crucial to recognize
that judicial interference in these domains destroys the purpose of vesting primary
responsibility in a unitary Executive.”227
Bolstering this conclusion, according to Thomas, is the judiciary’s own and abject
lack of expertise in these areas. First, “courts simply lack the relevant information
and expertise to second-guess determinations made by the President based on
information properly withheld.”228 Second, determining what information may be
safely made public is simply too “delicate [and] complex” a matter for courts. 229
Finally, the Court itself has ostensibly recognized the primacy of the political
branches in foreign and national security affairs. Unconsidered in this analysis was
any special capacities of the courts. 230 The dissent did not pause to consider the
structural counterpoint that an independent judiciary served to check the political
branches, especially when individual liberty was at stake. Nor did it discuss the
Court’s own expertise in making individual factual determinations concerning
individual deprivation of liberty. Still less did it talk about the Court’s capacity to
make such determinations against different levels of proof as set out either by the
Constitution or statute.
These tasks would mainly fall to Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion, announcing
the judgment that the federal courts did have substantive oversight power over the
decision to detain persons as “enemy combatants.” Justice O’Connor came to the case
with her well-known penchant to struggle with both sides of a question and split the

224. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 579 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 581 (quoting The Federalist No. 70, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,

1961)).

226. Id.
227. Id. at 582.
228. Id. at 583.
229. Id. (citation omitted).
230. Id.
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difference with some form of balancing test.231 It therefore came as no surprise that
she did exactly that here. As she said at the outset of her analysis, “It is beyond
question that substantial interests lie on both sides of the scale in this case.”232
On one side, the O’Connor plurality does not ignore either the executive’s
interests or its institutional advantages. In particular, the opinion noted that “weighty
and sensitive governmental interests in ensuring that those who have in fact fought
with the enemy during a war do not return to battle against the United States.”233 It
also took as a given the Constitution’s assignment of military decisionmaking and
policy to the President and Congress. “Without doubt,” Justice O’Connor observed,
“our Constitution recognizes that core strategic matters of war-making belong in the
hands of those who are best positioned and most politically accountable for making
them.”234 Article II concerns, and to some extent Article I considerations as well, had
to be taken into account.
Yet in stark contrast to the Thomas dissent, the O’Connor opinion saw another
side as well. Justice O’Connor bookended her discussion of the military perspective
by looking at the constitutional claims of detainees and the role of the judiciary in
safeguarding them. The claims rested squarely on Fifth Amendment Due Process.
The plurality acknowledged that the right at stake “is the most elemental of liberty
interests—the interest in being free from physical detention by one’s own
government.”235 Nor did the wartime setting change the reality that physical detention
affected this interest.236 To the contrary, on that point O’Connor noted a darker side
to the institutional capacity of the executive. “History and common sense,” she
opined, “teach us that an unchecked system of detention carries the potential to
become a means for oppression and abuse of others who do not present [a national
security] threat.”237
First and foremost the check against such potential abuse is “an impartial
adjudicator.”238 And not just any impartial adjudicator, but in this instance the federal
courts. As the plurality declared:
[W]e necessarily reject the Government’s assertion that separation of powers
principles mandate a heavily circumscribed role for the courts . . . . Indeed,
the position that the courts must forgo any examination of the individual case

231. Justice O’Connor, for example, long advocated an “undue burden” test that fell between strict scrutiny

and rational relationship analysis for abortion cases. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
871–74 (1992). Likewise, in the affirmative action context, while she asserted a strict scrutiny standard,
she was at pains to indicate that the test would not be as “fatal” to government measures as generally
understood. Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995).

232. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion).
233. Id. at 531.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 529.
236. Id. at 530.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 535.
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and focus exclusively on the legality of the broader detention scheme cannot
be mandated by any reasonable view of separation of powers, as this approach
serves only to condense power into a single branch of government. 239

The conclusion followed further given the judiciary’s role as guardian of fundamental
rights. As O’Connor put it, “Whatever power the United States Constitution
envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy
organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three
branches when individual liberties are at stake.”240 Any other conclusion would “turn
our system of checks and balances on its head.”241
All that said, the plurality’s specific cash-out of these principles might have done
more to fit the reality to the rhetoric. Under the plurality’s analysis, the balance
between the Bill of Rights and Article III on the one hand, and Article II on the
other, would be mediated by Mathews v. Eldridge, 242 a case usually associated with
the denial of government entitlement benefits.243 In this setting, a detainee could get
notice of the factual basis for the detention; could have a hearing to rebut that factual
basis; and at some point could have a lawyer. These specific safeguards may not quite
match the plurality’s high-flying analysis. That analysis, however, matters insofar as
it repudiated judicial deference when constitutional liberties are at stake. It would fall
to Justice Scalia in dissent to point to a better way forward. Joined by Justice Stevens,
the dissent argued that the government had only two options to get around Hamdi’s
habeas petition: it could charge him with treason (or some other similarly grave
crime), or it could seek to have Congress suspend the habeas option. 244 No less
importantly, the grounds for Scalia’s position rested squarely on Founding notions of
separation of powers. The Justice’s stance opposing the executive in favor of liberty
might at first blush appear out of character, 245 doubly so in light of his odd pairing
with Justice Stevens. The anomaly may not be that much more apparent than real,
but the reality of Scalia’s originalist approach does not lead to uniformly statist
results. Even under his narrow approach to history, the Justice has been known to
uphold individual rights against executive claims.246 The Hamdi dissent fits in just
this discrete area. To this extent, the Justice may rightfully claim adherence to
239. Id. at 535–36.
240. Id. at 536.
241. See id. at 536–37.
242. Id. at 529.
243. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
244. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
245. Notably, Justice Scalia voted to uphold the executive’s actions. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 488–89

(2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 577, 669–70 (2006) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).

246. Justice Scalia, for example, has applied this approach when interpreting the Sixth Amendment’s

guarantee of a person’s right to confront witnesses against him or her. See Giles v. California, 554 U.S.
353, 359–61 (2008). He has taken much the same approach in the Fourth Amendment context. See
Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 60–61 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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principled interpretation that trumps political inclination. Of even greater import is
that, more than the plurality, this dissent provides a foundation on which to build a
better constitutional analysis in the post-9/11 context.
That foundation rests first on the dissent’s result. The result limits the executive’s
options far more severely than the Mathews balancing test. At the end of the day,
that test as applied to Hamdi himself yielded no more than the right to notice, a
hearing, and at some point, counsel. For Scalia, the Constitution’s concern for basic
rights commands “that Hamdi is entitled to a habeas decree requiring his release
unless (1) criminal proceedings [most obviously for treason] are promptly brought, or
(2) Congress has suspended the writ of habeas corpus.”247 Since neither alternative
had occurred, Hamdi should have been held no longer.
Of greater significance is Scalia’s reasoning. More fully than the plurality, the
dissent rehabilitates the Constitution’s concern for individual liberty even in time of
national danger. It resurrects this historic commitment, moreover, with a near
complete reliance on history. Hamdi gives Scalia a classic opportunity to apply his
theory that the Constitution’s protection of rights was, for the most part, originally
understood to incorporate those protections as manifested in the common law at the
time of the Founding. This idea applies with special force when attached to a
particular text and with greater force still to habeas corpus since that is “the only
common-law writ to be explicitly mentioned [in the Constitution.]”248 Most of the
dissent, therefore, discusses the writ’s history. It conducts a 250-year excursion
through English history, demonstrating how habeas became the critical check on the
English monarch’s attempts to incarcerate individuals outside the law.249 It provides
liberal quotations from William Blackstone demonstrating the importance of habeas,
both in itself and to the greater idea of due process, on the eve of the American
Revolution. 250 It also notes the importance of Blackstone and the common law
tradition to the Founders. 251 Nor does Scalia stop here. He further considers the
possibility that criminal charges or legislative suspension of habeas may not have
been the only possibilities during times of national crisis. Starting with seventeenthcentury England and eighteenth-century America, he concludes no other alternative
existed.252 With respect to the United States, the dissent moves beyond the original
understanding and demonstrates that post-ratification custom maintained these
initial commitments.253
This is not to say that Scalia’s history is beyond reproach. On one hand, it may be
criticized as according habeas too broad an application. As a matter of eighteenth247. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 573 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 558.
249. Id. at 554–58.
250. Id. at 555, 561–62.
251. Id. at 555, 578–79.
252. Id. at 563–64.
253. Id. at 564–72.
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century common law, it is less than clear that the writ ran to persons captured or held
outside the territorial realm of Great Britain, Ireland, or the monarch’s dominions. If
so, the application of the right outside the United States would be problematic. On
the other hand, the dissent may be subjected to even greater criticism for its
narrowness. Like much of Scalia’s constitutional history, the Hamdi dissent has a
distinctly wooden, law-office quality.254 It mainly pours over English and American
precedent and commentary in painstaking detail in a quest to discern the precise
contours of habeas and the treason doctrine. This rigor in itself is not a bad thing. It
should not, however, be to the exclusion of the larger context in which habeas
developed, the possibility that the Founders’ reception of these doctrines may not
have been precise, or that the American understanding may (or may not) have been
even broader. That said, the dissent does end with a powerful coda suggesting that
the Founders’ purpose was not simply to replicate common law doctrine but to do so
precisely because they understood the threat to fundamental rights that times of
national crises entailed:
The Founders well understood the difficult tradeoff between safety and
freedom. “Safety from external danger,” Hamilton declared, “is the most
powerful director of national conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will,
after a time, give way to its dictates. The violent destruction of life and
property incident to war; the continual effort and alarm attendant on a state
of continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to liberty, to resort
for repose and security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy their
civil and political rights. To be more safe, they, at length, become willing to
run the risk of being less free.” The Founders warned us about the risk, and
equipped us with a Constitution designed to deal with it. Many think it not
only inevitable but entirely proper that liberty give way to security in times of
national crisis—that, at the extremes of military exigency, inter arma silent
leges. Whatever the general merits of the view that war silences law or
modulates its voice, that view has no place in the interpretation and application
of a Constitution designed precisely to confront war and, in a manner that
accords with democratic principles, to accommodate it. 255

This final flourish should serve as a double reminder. Whatever cavils one might
have, it is Justice Scalia, more than any of his colleagues, who marshals our founding
history in service of a proper framework for considering the roles of the executive and
judiciary in light of 9/11. Any consideration of that history indicates that a concern
for judicial protection of fundamental liberty is at a minimum as important as any
solicitude for the executive and national security.
Even then, the dissent has it only half-right. As this article has sought to
demonstrate, subsequent history has served merely to make these founding concerns
254. Compare Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 1780

Massachusetts Constitution indicated a separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers obvious
to the modern observer), with Flaherty, supra note 105, at 1768–71 (arguing that outside core meanings
of those powers, that constitution as well as others showed surprising disagreement about the details of
separation of powers).

255. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 578–79 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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greater. The executive has become infinitely greater than anything the Founders could
have envisioned, especially in light of the New Deal and the emergence of the modern
national security state. Beyond all of this, however, is the more recent development of
globalization, of which countering terrorism is part.256 To fully play its assigned role,
the courts should not just restore the founding concern for fundamental rights to their
analysis, nor simply note that the modern executive has grown so powerful that it puts
pressure on any original conception of a balance among the branches. Justices and
judges should also make explicit that foreign relations in the twenty-first century does
not merely reveal new threats to the nation’s external security but furnishes the
executive with even greater means to act as an institution that has a tendency to
destroy [a nation’s] civil and political rights.257 To date, the Supreme Court has done a
surprisingly good job of resisting calls for deference to the executive. With a deeper
understanding of the past and the present, it could do better.
VI. Conclusion

Over two-hundred years ago, Thomas Jefferson anticipated concern about the
relevance of a constitution that outlived the generation that created it.258 His concern
could only have grown that much greater at the prospect of an eighteenth-century
framework in a twenty-first-century world. To judge from the many opinions and
articles grappling with its implications, globalization highlights Jefferson’s concerns
about an antique constitution speaking to a far different era as perhaps no other
modern development could.
Yet if deference is any indication, at least separation of powers demonstrates the
Constitution’s vitality, especially in foreign relations. Contrary to what some
formalists aver, the Constitution’s founders did not work through the concept so
thoroughly or precisely as to effectively freeze their applications to the circumstances
of the late 1700s. Yet neither is separation of powers so general that it is merely an
invitation to struggle and nothing more. Rather, text, structure, and history yield a
structural approach to a separation of powers that spoke to its own day but which
remains no less germane to ours. At the Founding, considerations of efficiency led to
an executive far more powerful than any American predecessor, yet also one severely
constrained by the imperatives of balance and joint accountability. Today globalization
in its transgovernmental form cuts against executive pretensions even further. At
least with regard to treaty interpretation, the phenomenon does not particularly add
to the executive’s traditional claims based on expertise, claims which did not go
especially far in the early republic. By contrast, globalization places enormous pressure
on the value of balance in particular. It follows that there is even less reason for the
courts to defer to the executive now than before—and nowhere less so than in foreign
relations.
256. See supra Part IV.
257. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 578 (quoting The Federalist No. 8, at 33 (Alexander Hamilton) (G. Carey & J.

McClellan eds., 2001)).

258. See Jefferson, supra note 111, at 207–08.
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